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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that skill formation is a life-cycle process and develops the implications of this
insight for Scottish social policy. Families are major producers of skills, and a successful policy
needs to promote effective families and to supplement failing ones. We present evidence that early
disadvantages produce severe later disadvantages that are hard to remedy. We also show that
cognitive ability is not the only determinant of education, labor market outcomes and pathological
behavior like crime. Abilities differ in their malleability over the life-cycle, with noncognitive skills
being more malleable at later ages. This has important implications for the design of policy. The gaps
in skills and abilities open up early, and schooling merely widens them. Additional university tuition
subsidies or improvements in school quality are not warranted by Scottish evidence. Company-
sponsored job training yields a higher return for the most able and so this form of investment will
exacerbate the gaps it is intended to close. For the same reason, public job training is not likely to
help adult workers whose skills are rendered obsolete by skill-biased technological change. Targeted











University of Chicago1 Introduction
The Scottish economist Adam Smith attributed the wealth of a nation to the specialization and
division of its labor force. In the ￿rst book of his magnum opus, he wrote
The diﬀerence of natural talents in diﬀerent men is, in reality, much less than we
a r ea w a r eo f ;a n dt h ev e r yd i ﬀerent genius which appears to distinguish men of diﬀer-
ent professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the
cause, as the eﬀect of the division of labour. The diﬀerence between the most dissimilar
characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to
arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came
into the world, and for the ￿rst six or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps,
very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable
diﬀerence. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very diﬀerent
occupations. The diﬀerence of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by
degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any re-
semblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must
have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All
must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could
have been no such diﬀerence of employment as could alone give occasion to any great
diﬀerence of talents.
In this passage, Smith perceptively notes three basic economic forces that characterize modern
economies. Individuals, who diﬀer in talents and skills, bene￿t from pursuing their comparative
advantage by specializing in what they do best, and through trade and cooperation. Initial dif-
ferences in abilities become ampli￿ed through education and on-the-job learning; such investments
make persons more productive in the tasks they pursue. Education and learning are a major source
of both economic productivity and human diﬀerences.
Open markets encourage trade among diverse individuals and encourage investment in what we
now call human capital. Specialization and division of labor associated with lifetime skill formation
are major sources of economic growth and economic advantage.
The modern economy is based on skills. A skilled workforce is a productive one, able to adapt
to change and to innovate. Inequality in skills is a major determinant of inequality in earnings.
Scotland needs a more skilled workforce if it is to grow and prosper. This paper is about policies
to foster skills in the Scottish workforce.
One way to foster skill is to promote immigration of skilled labor to Scotland. A more open and
￿exible labor market will encourage such immigration. We brie￿y discuss this option at the end of
this essay. We do not discuss emigration. Some might argue that educating Scottish youngsters
to work in London is a bad business. That ignores altruism on the part of Scottish parents or
the bene￿ts that accrue to UK and world society. Given the proper incentives, Scots will stay in
Scotland. We focus most of our attention in this essay on policies to foster the skills of those born
in or resident in Scotland.
Smith￿s observations about markets and skills apply to Scotland today. He properly emphasized
the importance of acquiring skills in the workplace. Yet we have learned much more about the life
cycle of skill formation than Smith knew at the time he wrote the passage that we quote. We nowknow that, contrary to Smith￿s opinion, by age eight people are not all that similar and that basic
human diﬀerences emerge much earlier and cannot all be attributed to workplace experience or even
to education. A child￿s time spent with its family in its early years is crucial for its development.
Economists and psychologists have investigated the full life cycle of learning and have come to a
deeper understanding of the dynamics of the skill formation process. This new evidence changes
the way we think about policies to foster skills.
The central message of an entire literature, and a main theme of this paper, is that skill policy
is not the same as educational policy. Schooling is only a part of the skill formation process. What
schools can achieve largely depends on the quality of the students they work with. This in turn
depends on the quality of family life. An eﬀective skill formation policy must account for the role
of the family in producing skills and motivation. Dysfunctional families produce impaired children.
A successful skill formation policy encompasses family policy. The current emphasis in popular
discussions of skill formation policy focuses too much attention on aspects of schooling such as per
pupil expenditure in schools, tuition rates and the like, and too little on the role of the family
and the role of the ￿rm. Much learning takes place on the job after schooling is completed.1 A
comprehensive skill formation policy accounts for families, schools and ￿rms and their interactions.
The abilities and motivations of children emerge early and aﬀect performance in schools and the
work place. Bright, motivated children do better in school, are more likely to obtain higher education
degrees and participate in workplace-based training. As Adam Smith noticed, initial diﬀerences
among people are accentuated by educational and training choices. The downside aspect of the
dynamics of skill and ability formation is that those who start with early de￿cits, accumulate further
de￿cits. Remediation at later ages is costly and becomes prohibitively costly if it is attempted too
late.
The motto of the new economics of skill formation is that ￿skill begets skill; motivation begets
motivation.￿ Skill formation is a dynamic, synergistic process and these synergies must be tapped
if a successful skill formation policy is to be crafted.
The main lessons for Scotland from the modern literature are:
￿ Skill formation is a life cycle process. It begins in the womb and continues on in the workplace.
Educational policy is only one aspect of a successful skill formation policy, and not necessarily
the most important one.
￿ Families are major producers of skill. Dysfunctional families produce children with lower
levels of ability and motivation than functioning, healthy families. A successful skills policy
encompasses policies to promote successful families and to supplement failing ones. The
growing proportion of out-of-wedlock births and single parent families in Scotland and the
U.K. bodes ill for the future development of the Scottish workforce because such families are
known to produce impaired children who perform poorly in school, the workplace and society
at large.
￿ Skill is created through a dynamic synergistic process. Skill begets skill. Early advantages
produce later advantages. Early disadvantages produce severe later disadvantages that are
hard to remedy.
1Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998a) estimate that over 40% of post-family in￿uence learning takes place after
formal schooling ends.
2￿ Skills are multidimensional in nature. Both cognitive and noncognitive skills are important
in the workplace and in performance in schools. An emphasis on IQ or on success measured
by achievement tests is misguided but conventional in policy discussions about skill formation
around the world. Successful policy recognizes the multiplicity of skills and works with it.
￿ The heterogeneities in skills and abilities that open up at an early age produce heterogeneity
in the economic returns to schooling. Rates of return to university education vary greatly
among persons. The return to the marginal student is nowhere near as high as the return to
the average student, although many scholars in the United Kingdom often fail to make this
distinction and estimate average rates of return when discussing educational policy. They use
methods which do not allow them to distinguish the marginal return from the average return.
More sophisticated analyses show declining returns for marginal students. Simply put, the
university is not for everyone, and skill formation policy should recognize this.
￿ Skills diﬀer in their malleability over the life cycle. Contrary to the quote from Smith, IQ
is more or less set by age eight and it varies greatly among persons. Noncognitive skills are
malleable until later ages. This has important implications for the design of policy.
￿ At current levels of spending, changes in conventional educational policies that receive most
of the attention in the economics of education￿such as reductions in pupil-teacher ratios or
increases in traditional schooling quality￿are unlikely to have dramatic eﬀects on economic
or social performance. When evaluated, they do not survive a cost bene￿t test.
￿ Policies subsidizing university tuition and other schooling expenses need to be rethought.
Abilities formed at early ages play a much more decisive role in accounting for disparities in
college enrollment than tuition or family income facing children and their families at the age
children contemplate going to college.
￿ There is a well established empirical regularity found in most societies that children from
families with higher incomes are more likely to go to school and achieve higher education.
This empirical regularity is usually interpreted to mean that ￿credit constraints￿ aﬀect school
choice and that tuition policy is the appropriate solution. The weight of the empirical evidence
from many countries suggests another interpretation with vastly diﬀerent policy implications.
Families with higher incomes provide better early environments for their children. Interven-
tions in the early years are far more likely to be eﬀective in promoting college attendance
than tuition supplements or scholarships paid at a later age. Children lacking ability and
motivation do not make good college students.
￿ The problem of ￿credit constraints￿￿bright children denied university education because
of low family income, is greatly overstated in popular discussions of educational policy in
England, Scotland and the US. This alleged problem exerts disproportionate in￿uence on
policy discussions everywhere. Fewer than 8% of students are constrained in this sense in the
US or the UK. Targeted subsidies for these constrained students are economically justi￿ed,
but raising tuition for the others may also prove to be a prudent policy. This kind of policy
will raise support for education by channeling educational funds toward students who bene￿t
most from them and by screening out unproductive, low quality students for whom schooling
is a poor investment.
3￿ Post-school, on-the-job training (OJT) is a productive activity with a high economic rate of
return. The return is higher for the most able and so this form of investment is disequalizing.
It perpetuates, and even exacerbates, initial disadvantages.
￿ During periods of transition to new technologies or open markets, certain skills become obso-
lete. Workers adapted to one technology and way of doing business may be ill suited to new
modes of production and trade. Retraining younger and more able workers to higher levels of
skill can be a sound investment.
￿ Public job training programs targeted toward older displaced workers and the less able have
a sorry track record. Remedial training for such people is simply not eﬀective, so that there
are better uses for those funds. Wage subsidies and policies that promote ￿exibility in the
labor market are far more likely to promote employment than job training. Such subsidies
should be cohort-speci￿c to avoid creating a new generation of unskilled workers dependent
on government for their livelihood.
￿ Tax policy reforms are not likely to increase human capital accumulation dramatically, al-
though they can promote capital formation and raise wages.
This paper elaborates and documents these points. Section 2 presents some basic facts about
the Scottish labor market and trends in Scottish education. Our analysis will be a comparative
one, placing the situation in context with that of other developed nations. Section 3 reviews the
evidence that supports the claims made in this section. Section 4 discusses interventions that have
proven to be eﬀective in the past. We draw on two papers by Heckman (2000a) and Carneiro and
Heckman (2003) that present more detailed support for these arguments. We also draw on the
academic literature on the UK. Section 5 concludes with policy recommendations for Scotland.
2 Comparing England, Scotland and the US
In order to design eﬀective policies, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the problems that
the policies are intended to address. This requires getting straight the facts about Scotland. This
task is not a simple one for all of the aspects of the Scottish economy because many studies neglect
Scotland and do not distinguish uniquely Scottish problems. When we can break out Scottish
data, we will. Otherwise, we will draw on evidence from the UK as a whole. With a few notable
exceptions, the empirical patterns are very closely linked, which leads us to believe that our analysis
is at least qualitatively correct and our policy recommendations are appropriate. Our comparative
advantage lies in being able to oﬀer a fresh perspective, bringing our expertise on US data to bear
on Scottish issues. Those who are more familiar with the intricacies of Scottish society are better
suited to tailor precise policies.
We consider several dimensions of the Scottish economy: wage premia for skilled labor, wage
inequality, unemployment and worklessness, illegitimacy, crime, educational attainment and partic-
ipation; and skills of the labor force. This creates a background for our discussion of skill formation
policy.
Like many countries and regions in the world, Scotland had experienced a shift in demand
toward more skilled labor. This has produced a premium for those who have skills as well as wage
4inequality between those who have skills and those who do not. Scots have responded to the rising
economic return to schooling by increasing their participation in higher education. The Scottish
participation rate in higher education is increasing while among recent cohorts it is stagnating in
t h eU Sa n dt h eU K .
At the same time, there are major sources of concern for Scotland. Worklessness is increasing;
levels of literacy and numeracy are low and are not increasing in the younger cohorts. There is clear
evidence of social pathology in the sense of more out-of-wedlock births, high crime rates and the
like. Given the evidence that out of wedlock children acquire poorer lifetime skills than others, an
emerging Scottish underclass should be a major source of concern addressed in any comprehensive
skill formation policy.
There is also a growing group of middle age workers caught up in the dynamics of production
transformation. Trained to work in obsolescent technologies, their skills are maladapted to the new
economy, especially at current wage levels. Many advocate public job retraining, but the case for
this activity is weak, especially for middle age and low ability workers. More creative thinking is
required to devise policies to ease their transition, promote their employability and at the same
time equip their children with the skills needed to work in the new economy.
2.1 Wage Inequality and Education
Educational attainment and basic literacy have become increasingly important because of the rising
premium for skilled labor found in many countries. Since the late 70s, the economic return to
education (the economic bene￿t of attending school) has risen.2 Growth in overall wage inequality
for both men and women is substantial.
A rise of the wage skill premium occurred in Scotland and England. Figure 1 shows that
the growth of average weekly gross wages of English and Scottish workers increases with their
educational level.3 The skill wage premium for those with a degree or higher is rising with respect
to A levels/Highers. This is a combination of both a rise in wages for highly educated and a ￿at A
level pro￿le in the last 15 years. The same is true with respect to O levels/O grades. The widening
wage diﬀerentials we observe in ￿gure 1 are also apparent in the real hourly wage trends for the
10th, 50th and 90th percentiles4 of the UK and US wage distributions analyzed by Gosling and
Lemieux (2001). They ￿nd that in both countries, women have higher rates of wage growth relative
to men, and apparent wage growth is larger in the UK than the US.5 The 10th decile in the UK
has apparently not lost ground in real terms and has actually experienced substantial wage growth,
especially for women. The UK￿s 50th percentile has improved signi￿cantly as well. This is not
the case in the US. Although the diﬀerence between the highest paid and the lowest paid worker
has grown both in the UK and the US, in the US the least skilled have lost ground in real terms
2See the time-series on US returns to education in Card and DiNardo (2002).
3Scottish and English school quali￿cations diﬀer. Until 1986 the Scottish equivalent of O levels were O grades.
After that time, Standard Grades were awarded. Until 1999 Scottish students completed Highers and then in the
following year CSYS as their certi￿cates for post school education, a role comparable to the two year A level entry
quali￿cation in England. After 1999 these have been replaced on a phased basis by the Higher Still programme of
Highers and Advanced Highers.
4Percentiles measure relative position in the hourly wage distribution. The 90th percentile line represents the
average wages for those whose wages are greater than or equal to 90% of the people in the sample. The 10th percentile
is the 10% at the very bottom. The median line represent the people from the middle￿the 50th percentile.
5It is important to note that despite the rapid growth in their wages, women still earn less then men.
5w h i l et h e yh a v en o ti nt h eU K . 6 It is clear, however, that growth in inequality took place mostly
during the 1980s, and inequality remained mostly stable in the 1990s. Growth in inequality has
been similar in England and Scotland, although there has been some slight divergence in the last
decade (see Bell, 2004).
The primary force generating the skill premium is skill-biased technical change. As documented
in Machin and Van Reenen (1997), the shift in the demand for skilled workers has operated in
many sectors of the economy and is found in all countries around the world where it has been
studied. Another factor contributing to the wage skill premium is the uncertainty induced by rapid
technological change and the uncertainty created by open markets. As noted by Nelson and Phelps
(1966) and Schultz (1975), those with more education and skill are better able to cope with, and
bene￿t from, changes and opportunities that open up with increased trade and new technology.
A more skilled workforce can create new technologies and opportunities. The modern economy is
based on skills far more advanced than those used in Scotland in the mid-18th century as described
by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.
However, as noted by Smith, not everyone should be equally skilled or trained in the same
fashion. Comparative advantage operates among people and among nations. For some workers,
training is not an eﬃcient investment. Scotland needs a full portfolio of skills, but it should increase
its weight on skilled workers.
2.2 Employment and Worklessness
Historically, England has had slightly higher employment and slightly lower unemployment rates
than Scotland for all age groups, though the trends are converging in recent years. Labor force
withdrawal rates are very similar.
In the UK, worklessness is becoming increasingly more common, while the opposite is true for
the US, especially for single mothers. Dickens and Ellwood (2003) summarize the eﬀect of policy
under the Blair government and compare them to the policies in the US during the same period.
They argue that the British reforms focused on increasing employment of individuals who faced few
bene￿ts from entering the labor market.7 However, simultaneous reforms oﬀset these employment
incentives by improving out-of-work bene￿ts.8 The net eﬀect seems to have boosted employment
(see Gregg and Harkness, 2003). The Clinton strategy in the US was quite diﬀerent. Out-of-work
bene￿ts were cut and time limits were introduced. EITC payments to low wage workers increased.
After these reforms, bene￿ts for workers were substantially higher than for those out of work.
Dickens and Ellwood (2001) show that in England, the rise in worklessness took place over a
period with stable unemployment and employment rates that have remained unchanged between
6The analysis of Blundell, Reed and Stoker (2003) cautions us that selective dropouts from the low end of the
wage distribution bias upward these ￿gures. Their adjusted estimates make the US and UK experiences appear to
be more similar, so real wages at the bottom of the UK distribution may be declining.
7The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) raised in-work bene￿ts for those with children, and the Childcare
Tax Credit provided increased childcare support for working low income families. Moreover, the lowest income tax
rate was reduced from 20 to 10%. National Insurance reforms lowered fees for those with low wages and a National
Minimum Wage of £3.60 per hour was introduced for workers older than 22. Non-￿nancial incentives included
improvements in childcare provision.
8Bene￿t rates for out of work families with children were raised. Child Bene￿t rates, which are non-means tested
and paid to every household with children, were increased. Income Support rates for low income families with
children raised, while those for families without children stagnated.
61979 and 1999.9 However, the overall statistics obscure some important facts about worklessness.
Nickell (2004) notes that unemployment among men with no quali￿cations has risen from 7% in
1979 to 12% in 1999, though unskilled women experienced no such change. Moreover, inactivity
among working age men has risen from 4.7% to 15.9%, while inactivity among working age women
has fallen from 34.6% to 26.9%. An increase in the labor force participation of married women with
employed partners has disguised a decrease in participation of single women with children. The rise
in inactivity among men has been among married men whose partners cease to work and among
single men. Households where both partners are working and households where neither partner
is working have become more common.10 This is true for Scotland as well. Bell and Jack (2002)
report that from 1992 to 2001, the fraction of workless households in all working-age households
rose from 17% to 22%. The fraction of households where all adults are employed rose from 54% to
5 7 % ,w h i l et h ef r a c t i o nw h e r eo n l ys o m ea d u l t sw o r kf e l lf r o m3 0 %t o2 1 % .
Worklessness has increased markedly for the youngest cohorts.11 Murray (2001) studies the
change in employment among males ages 18 to 24 between 1989 and 1999. He shows that workless-
ness rose from 20.5 to 31.2, and that attrition from the labor force was highest for those between
ages of 20 and 24. Faggio and Nickell (2003) show that for men inactivity was concentrated among
low-skill individuals. Gregg and Wadsworth (2003) attribute the recent drop in unemployment
among the low-skilled to a transition to worklessness rather than improved employment. Figures
2A-B shows that Scotland and England share this trend. Increased participation in higher educa-
tion is not the reason behind this disturbing trend. It is linked to declining real wages and higher
social bene￿ts.
To put these numbers in perspective, Dickens and Ellwood (2001) estimate that in the US in
1999, less than 5% of two-parent families with children are workless. Such families without children
are only marginally more likely to be without work. For single parents with children, worklessness
has fallen from a peak of 44% in 1982 to about 27% in 1999 (see Dickens and Ellwood, 2001).
The corresponding number for single parents without children is slightly above 20%. As noted
by Nickell (2004) this cross-country diﬀerence is explained in part by generous welfare bene￿ts in
the UK. However, Dickens and Ellwood (2001) argue that the movement of people into work has
not done much to decrease relative poverty. Individuals who enter the labor market increase their
income, but they usually do not earn high wages. This occurs because worklessness is closely linked
with education and skill, and it is concentrated among the less skilled and educated persons.
9Since 1998, there has been a slight decline in worklessness and a simultaneous increase in the employment rate for
all of the groups in the UK as measured in the Labour Force Survey (see Shaw (2004)). The decrease in worklessness
has been especially large for lone parents with children. However, the rates reported in Shaw (2003) are slightly
lower in 1998 than the ones in Dickens and Ellwood (2003), who use the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which
leads us to believe some of the diﬀerence in the rates may be due to diﬀerences in the sample selection criteria, such
as age and dependency.
10Between 1979 and 1999, the percentage of households where both partners are employed in all two-adult house-
holds has increased from 55% to 64%. The corresponding change in households where neither partner is working was
4t o8 % .
11Looking over a longer period, Gregg and Wadsworth (2003) point out that in 1996, 19.3% of all British households
had no employed adult in them. By 2002, this percentage has fallen to 16.8%. However, this is still far above the
1975 rate of about 7%. Gregg and Wadsworth (2003) exclude full-time students and households headed by people of
retirement age.
72.3 Illegitimacy and Poverty
Murray (2001) shows that the illegitimacy rate￿de￿n e da st h ep e r c e n t a g eo fc h i l d r e nb o r nt ou n -
married mothers￿increased from 5% to nearly 40% in England between 1950 and 2000.12 Almost
80% of that increase has occurred in the last 20 years. Haskey (2001) shows that both the num-
ber of one-parent13 families and the number of children living in such families rose between 1984
and 2000, though both trends appear to have slowed in recent years. In 1986, one-parent families
represented 14% of all families with dependent children. In 1991 the ￿gure was 20%. By 2000,
one-parent families comprised 25% of all families with dependent children and the percentage of
dependent children from one-parent families was 23 percent of all dependent children. Moreover,
the percentage of all families with dependent children headed by lone mothers increased at a rapid
rate since 1971 (see Haskey, 2001). It is now just under 1 in 4, while in the 1970s it was 1 in 12.
Kiernan (2001) reports that although lower in 1975 and 1985, the rate of out-of-wedlock births per
100 births in the UK exceeded the US rate by 1999. In Scotland, non-married households with
dependent children comprise 40% of all households with dependent children.14
These changes in family structure have occurred on a short time scale, and they have far-reaching
consequences for the oﬀspring of such families. For instance, in 2001 in Scotland, only 48% of lone
parent households with dependent children were employed with about half working only part-time,
while 90% of couples with children have at least one partner employed.15 Employment is closely
linked with poverty. Bell and Jack (2002) report that only 5% of the households where everyone
worked were poor,16 and only 10% of households where at least one person worked were poor.
However, 38% of households where no adults worked were in poverty. The corresponding numbers
for the percentage of children in poverty were 11%, 22% and 67%. At the same time, the percentage
of children living in absolute poverty in Scotland has fallen over time and the percentage of children
living in relative poverty has remained stable or fallen slightly.17 This suggests that generous
12High illegitimacy rates are not only con￿ned to poor neighborhoods. However, there does seem to be strong link
between social class (as measured by occupation) and out-of-wedlock births. Murray (1994) reports that in 1991,
the correlation between the percentage of households in Class V (unskilled workers) within local authorities and the
illegitimacy rate there was 0.7.
13A one-parent family is de￿ned as a mother or father living without a spouse (and not cohabiting) with his or her
never-married dependent child or children aged under 16 or from 16 to under 19 and undertaking full-time education.
14We de￿ne non-married households as cohabiting couples, lone parents and other households. A dependent child
is a person in a household aged 0 to 15 (whether or not in a family) or a person aged 16 to 18 who is a full-time
student and in a family with parent(s). We included other households with dependent children (i.e.,t h o s ew h or e p o r t
being not-married or non-cohabiting) in our calculations, though this does not change the results signi￿cantly.
15Data are from the SCROL database of the 2001 Census, available at
http://www.scrol.gov.uk/scrol/common/home.jsp.
A dependent child is a person in a household aged 0 to 15 (whether or not in a family) or a person aged 16 to
18 who is a full-time student in a family with parent(s). Part-time is de￿ned as working 30 hours or less a week.
Full-time is de￿ned as working 31 or more hours a week.
16Bell and Jack (2002) de￿ne poverty as having income that is less than 60% of median household income after
housing costs.
17Absolute poverty measures progress against a base year. It is de￿ned as the percentage of children who live in
households where the income from all sources is below some fraction of mean (or median) income in a ￿xed year,
adjusted for in￿ation. Relative poverty uses a benchmark that changes from year to year, i.e., the fraction of mean
or median income from all sources in the relevant year. The most recent data on children in poverty is summarized
in Department of Work and Pensions (2004).
8government bene￿ts have been responsible for oﬀsetting some of the negative eﬀect.
McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) observe that children from single-parent households are more
likely to be poor, and have health and psychological problems. They are also more likely to engage
in crime, report worse labor market outcomes and have unstable marriages. DeLeire and Kalil
(2002) ￿nd that American teenagers from unmarried families are less likely to graduate high school
or attend college. They are also more likely to smoke and drink at a young age. McLanahan and
Sandefur (1994) con￿rm that various outcomes for stepchildren are similar to those of children
from single-parent families. Ginther and Pollak (2004) show that even joint biological children from
blended18 families have inferior outcomes relative to children reared in traditional nuclear families.
In fact, educational outcomes for all children in blended families are very similar to the outcomes for
children from single parent families. Stepchildren are also at a greater risk for abuse by step-parents
and cohabiting partners (see Daly and Wilson, 1998). The problem of broken homes and out of
wedlock births has serious implications for the skills and performance of the next generation.19
Many analysts dismiss this research because correlation, even with extensive statistical controls,
does not establish causation. One stylized fact from this literature is that controlling for factors
such as long term family income, parental education and cognitive ability greatly diminishes the
eﬀect of family structure on child outcomes (e.g., Ginther and Pollak, 2004). This suggests that
at least some of the disadvantages of nontraditional child-rearing can be oﬀset by improving home
environments. However, it is not clear which policies should be chosen since the current literature
does not determine the causal mechanisms producing these relationships. For instance, divorce and
family resources may be jointly determined and outcomes may simply re￿ect common unobserved
factors.20 There is, however, an emerging literature that uses parental death as a natural experiment.
T h ed e a t ho fap a r e n th a sas m a l l e rn e g a t i v ee ﬀect on children than divorce.21 For instance, Cherlin
et al. (1995) use NCDS data to compare the behavioral outcomes of British adults who experienced
divorce or parental death as children with adults reared in intact families. One advantage of their
study is that they control for various pre-divorce characteristics of the family and the child, such as
pre-existing emotional problems, cognitive achievement and socioeconomic status. They ￿nd that by
age 23, both men and women with divorced parents are more likely to leave home because of friction
and to have their ￿rst child born outside of marriage. Moreover, while experiencing the death of
a parent seems to exert a similar eﬀect, it is usually much smaller. This is a consistent ￿nding,
and suggests that some portion of the bene￿ts from marriage is not purely a matter of increased
resources. Carefully tailored policy needs to bolster family structure as well as compensate for the
lack thereof with educational interventions like enriched preschools, which we discuss in this essay.
18Blended families are de￿n e da sh o u s e h o l d st h a tc o n t a i nb o t hs t e p c h ildren and their half-siblings who are the
joint biological children of both parents.
19W h i l em o s to ft h ee v i d e n c ew ep r e s e n tc o m e sf r o ms t u d i es based on US data, it is likely that the conclusions
apply to Scotland.
20Perhaps single or divorced parents have personality traits that make them both poor parents and poor spouses.
Another hypothesis is that diﬃcult children drive parents apart. Most of the correlational literature is not able to
distinguish these explanations.
21For comparisons of parental death and divorce, see Lang and Zagorsky (2001), Corak (2001) and Biblarz and
Gottainer (2000).
92.4 Crime in England, Scotland and the US
In recent years, serious crime rates are higher in England22 than in the United States. This pattern
is evident in both surveys of crime victims as well as the reported police statistics. Langan and
Farrington (1998) analyze data from the 1995 victim surveys. They show that robbery, assault,
burglary and motor vehicle theft are all higher and generally rising in England.23 The major
exception to this pattern is the murder rate, which is nearly six times higher in the US despite the
large drop in the late 90s. Langan and Farrington (1998) also show that an oﬀender￿s risk of being
caught, convicted and sentenced to incarceration has risen in the US for all types of crime,24 but
has fallen in England for all but murder. Moreover, for all oﬀenses, courts in the US hand down
longer sentences and con￿nement is generally also longer.25
Figure 3 examines the incidence and prevalence of overall victimization26 in 1999.27 Prevalence
rates are de￿ned as the percentage of those aged 16 or more who experienced a speci￿cc r i m eo n c e
or more in a given year. Incidence rates express the number of crimes experienced by each 100
people in the sample. In terms of both prevalence and incidence, England has signi￿cantly higher
rates than Scotland and the US, which are not essentially diﬀerent. When incidence is high relative
to prevalence, we can surmise that crime is concentrated in the sense that few people experience the
bulk of it. The gap is very wide in England and Wales and the US, suggesting that when people are
victims they are more prone to repeated victimization. By this measure, Scotland￿s crime seems to
be somewhat more evenly distributed.
Another alarming statistic is the estimated number of children who have parents with a serious
drug problem. A recent report by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs infers that there are
between 40,800 and 58,700 children in Scotland who have a parent who is a problem drug user.28
This represents about 4-6% of the 1 million children under 16. However, it is true that fewer children
live with a problem drug user: only about 1-2%.
Crime is also related to educational attainment, skill levels and the returns to market activities.
Machin and Meghir (2000) ￿nd that falling wages of unskilled workers led to increases in crime in
England and Wales between 1975 and 1996. They also ￿nd the level of criminal activity and the
returns to crime are similarly closely linked, while increased deterrence is negatively linked with
crime. This suggests that there are several approaches to stemming crime.
22In our discussion of crime, data for England also includes Wales unless speci￿ed explicitly.
23Langan and Farrington (1998) also argue that police statistics from 1996 show that assault, burglary and motor
vehicle theft rates are higher in England than in the US. They also argue that the measured robbery rate would have
been higher in England if the police recorded the same fraction of robberies as the US police. This problem with
police statistics leads us to emphasize the results from the victimization surveys.
24The six measured types of crime are murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.
25It is true, however, that both the length of sentences and time served are rising in England for violent crimes.
26Crimes that are included in the overall rate are car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, motorcycle theft, bicycle
t h e f t ,b u r g l a r y ,a t t e m p t e db u r g l a r y ,r o b b e r y ,p e r s o n a lt h e f t ,s e x u a li n c i d e n t sa n da s s a u l to rt h r e a t s .
27T h i si sb a s e do nV a nK e s t e r e net al. (2001). This report uses data from the International Crime Victims Survey.
It avoids the problem of diﬀerential reporting and de￿nitions involved in using police data by using a common survey
instrument across countries.
28The lower estimate would be the correct one if both parents used drugs, while the higher estimate would be
appropriate if only one parent was a drug user. The percentage is calculated using the 2000 population estimates.
102.5 Educational Attainment
How have Scottish youth responded to the new demand for skills? Here we look at educational
responses because they are easily studied. Evidence for other source of skill, such as on the job
learning, is less easily obtained. Figure 4 compares higher educational attainment of Scottish,
English and US29 cohorts born after 1940. The percentage of each cohort with at least a college30
degree has increased in both Scotland and England over time, especially for those born after the
late 1960s.31 Both the levels and their rates of growth are fairly similar in England and Scotland,
with the fraction of college graduates approaching one quarter for recent cohorts. In the US, the
percentage of residents with at least a degree is higher, and the acceleration in enrollment begins
earlier, though it is less steep than comparable rates for Scotland and England. There appears to
be a decline in attainment for those born after 1969. This pattern has not emerged in England or
Scotland.
Historically the fraction of the population with low or no quali￿cations (see ￿gure 5) has declined.
However, this proportion has been virtually constant for some years.32 The fraction of dropouts
has grown in the US, relative to older cohorts, though it is still considerably lower than in the UK.
One area of concern is the stagnation in participation (as opposed to completion) in post-
compulsory education. In the US, college enrollment has stagnated for recent cohorts, even as
completion is rising (see ￿gure 6). Completion rates cannot increase inde￿nitely, though there is
still a lot of room for it to grow since the US college dropout rate is approximately 40%.I nE n g l a n d ,
both staying on rates after 16 and college participation33 are stagnating for the youngest cohorts
29The US sample contains only Whites. The UK data is separated by place of residence, and not by birth, though
this does not change the results. The data is presented in 5 year moving averages. In the UK, the college category
contains those who have a higher degree; NVQ level 5; ￿rst degree, or other degree quali￿cations. In the US, it
contains those with Bachelor￿s, Master￿s, Professional or Doctoral degrees.
30In the US, the distinction between colleges and universities is that latter also oﬀer graduate programs in addition
to the ordinary four-year curriculum. There are also institutions called community colleges, which do not award
regular degrees. They are similar to further education colleges in the UK. In this paper, we will often refer to college
in the American sense of the word, unless we indicate otherwise.
31Much of the jump in college attainment for those born after 1960 can be attributed to the reconstitution of the
polytechnics as university institutions in 1992. This shift in supply essentially doubled the number of universities in
the UK (see Lowe, 2002). Huisman et al. (2003) attribute the expansion in polytechnics and college sector between
1989 and 1994 to formula funding, which uses a core plus margin model. This formula means that institutions receive
between 5 and 10% of their funding (the margin) as a function of how many additional students they were able to
recruit at a lower price. This led the schools to expand vacancies until the marginal cost of each student equaled the
average one. A similar university expansion was enabled by raising tuition fees to approximately 30% of instructional
costs, and giving these fees to the university for all the additional students they attracted. Overall, enrollments in
higher education was growing by more than 10% per year in the early 1990s. By 1994, this expansion was halted,
though since 1998 a number of initiatives have been taken to widen and deepen participation. At the same time,
however, higher education in the 90s has become less aﬀordable as grants were replaced by loans, an a system of
student fees was introduced. However, Callender and Kemp (2000) argue that the UCAS data shows no reduction
in enrollment of students from lower classes.
32I nt h eU S ,h o w e v e r ,t h eg r o w t hi ne x a mc e r t i ￿cation as an alternative route to high school completion has
resulted in apparent decrease in high school drop out rates. This decline is mainly illusory. Recent research indicates
that exam-certi￿ed recipients are not equivalent to high school graduates (Cameron and Heckman, 1993).
33We us the Age Participation Index (API) which measures the number of home domiciled young (aged under 21)
initial entrants to full-time and sandwich undergraduate courses, expressed as a proportion of the average 18 to 19
year old population of Great Britain. Blanden and Machin (2003) argue that the increase in staying on is due to the
introduction of the General Certi￿cate of Secondary Education (GCSE) in 1988 and the consequent improvement in
11(see Blanden and Machin, 2003). These trends are troubling. It is important to also note that
the UK has a much lower higher education dropout rate of 18%.34 This suggests that stagnation
in participation is much more likely to begin exerting a downward pull on completion in the UK
since the two rates are much closer together. However, until recently, the age participation index
for Scotland does not seem to be stagnating,35 as it is in England (see ￿gure 7).
2.6 Literacy and Numeracy
The news on basic workforce skills is not so encouraging. Scotland, the UK and the US have a thick
lower tail of barely literate and numerate persons, who are a drag on productivity and adaptability
and who are a source of social problems. We use data from the International Adult Literacy Survey
(IALS) to examine literacy and numeracy of adults of working age (16-65 years).36 Three dimensions
of literacy are used. Prose literacy is de￿ned as the knowledge and skills required to understand and
use information from texts such as newspaper articles and ￿ctional passages. Document literacy
is de￿ned as the ability to locate and use information from timetables, graphs, charts and forms.
Quantitative literacy is de￿ned as applying arithmetic operations, either alone or sequentially, to
numbers embedded in printed materials, such as calculating savings from an advertisement or the
interest earned on an investment. These data allow us to compare the distributions in US, Scotland,
England, Germany and Sweden. The IALS grouped the scale scores into ￿ve empirically determined
levels, with Level 1 representing the lowest ability level and Level 5 representing the highest. In
￿gures 8-10, we plot the proportion of each gender group falling in a particular level of literacy
by country and the 95% con￿dence intervals for these estimates. Because a small proportion of
people tested at the highest skill categories, we collapse levels 4 and 5 together. Relative to the US
and England, Scotland has a lower proportion of people who fall in the highest levels of literacy
and especially numeracy, though the diﬀerence is usually not precisely determined. Germany and
Sweden perform better than the English-speaking countries.37 McIntosh (2003) examines these
data. Those with good to excellent literacy skills enjoy a sizeable wage premium over those who do
exam results.
34This estimate comes from Smith and Naylor (2001). They estimate the US college dropout rate to be approxi-
mately 37%, which is consistent with our own estimate. It also important to note that the British system remains
selective, though perhaps increasingly less so. Huisman et al. (2003) report that almost 23% of applicants were
denied admission in 2000. The corresponding number in 1994 was 34%.
35In 2000, the Scottish Government capped the number of places for domestic students and this is re￿ected in the
￿at pro￿le in the API for Scotland in the most recent years. In contrast, the English government intends to raise the
participation rates in England and Wales rise to 50% of 18-30-year-olds in either full or part-time higher education
by 2010. This measure of participation is rate is currently at 44% in England.
36The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) was conducted by 13 countries to collect information on
adult literacy. In this survey, large samples of adults (ranging from 1,500 to 6,000 per country) were given the
same broad test of their literacy skills between 1994 and 1996. The participating countries are Australia, Bel-
gium (Flanders), Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Poland,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. More information on the IALS is available in documents located at
http://www.nald.ca/nls/ials/introduc.htm and IALS (2002).
37In terms of test scores, there is remarkable similarity in the literacy scores between the US, UK and Scotland.
They are, however, considerably lower than the scores of German and Swedish workers. Moreover, these diﬀerences
are not driven by illiterate immigrants. While immigrants perform worse on the three tests relative to natives,
including immigrants in the analysis only raises the proportion of US females in Level 1 signi￿cantly for prose,
quantitative and document literacy. The diﬀerence is not signi￿cant for any other group or level. The calculations
are available upon request from the authors.
12not, even accounting for their schooling attainment. Moreover, he ￿nds that the younger cohorts
do not have better skills than older ones. Younger cohorts are no better or even worse on literacy
and numeracy, respectively.
In light of the encouraging performance of Scottish students on the 2000 Programme For In-
ternational Student Assessment (PISA) survey of 15 year olds38, it is surprising to see the literacy
of the youngest Scots may not be improving. Figure 11 shows the means and the 95% con￿dence
intervals for the overall reading score from the Progress In Reading Literacy Survey (PIRLS) for
4th graders from several OECD countries in 2001.39 Scotland￿s students perform signi￿cantly worse
than students in England and Sweden, though Scotland￿s performance is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent
from that of US or of Germany.40
Scottish youths are going to colleges at higher rates than their parents and participation is
increasing rather than stagnating as it is in England and the US. At the same time, there is a
serious problem with the bottom half of the skill distribution as measured by their numeracy and
literacy. The growth in worklessness and crime￿linked to declining wages of the unskilled￿bodes
ill for the Scottish economy. Social polarization as measured by income inequality across skill groups
is increasing. One way to address these problems is to invest in the skills of the young and possibly
also to upgrade the skills of the adult workforce.
What would be the best way to foster the skills of the Scottish workforce? We now turn to
an examination of some basic principles in the new economics of skill formation. We also present
evidence on the eﬀectiveness of various interventions.
3 Lessons on Skill Formation From Around The World
Eﬀective policy analysis is based on empirically grounded studies of the sources of the problems
that the proposed policies are intended to address. A major lesson from recent research is that
the skills acquired in one stage of the life cycle aﬀect both the endowments and the technology
of learning at the next stage. Human capital is produced over the life cycle by families, schools,
and ￿rms, although most discussions of skill formation focus on schools as the major producer of
abilities and skills.
A major determinant of successful schools is successful families.41 Schools work with what
parents bring them. They operate more eﬀectively if parents reinforce them by encouraging and
motivating children. Job training programs, whether public or private, work with what families
and schools supply them and cannot remedy twenty years of neglect. Scottish skill formation policy
38In the PISA survey, Scotland has a very low fraction of students who perform at the lowest levels of reading
literacy. The scale scores on reading, math and even science are also fairly high. See Education and Young People
Research Unit (2002) for more details.
39The PIRLS database is accessible at http://lighthouse.air.org/timss/.
40There may be two sources of bias that eﬀect the cross-country interpretation of the PIRLS scores. The average
number of years spent in school by the surveyed students in Scotland was 5, as it was in England. The corresponding
number for the US, Sweden and Germany was 4 years. However, on average, Scottish students were 9.8 years old at
t h et i m eo ft h es u r v e yw h i l eA m e r i c a na n dE n g l i s hc h i l d r e nw e r eb o t h1 0 . 2 ,a n dG e r m a na n dS w e d i s hc h i l d r e nw e r e
10.5 and 10.9, respectively. Thus the direction of bias is not obvious and depends on the relative eﬀect of age and
schooling on reading ability in each country.
41Coleman (1966) ￿rst established this and an entire literature summarized in Heckman (2000a) and Carneiro and
Heckman (2003) supports his ￿ndings.
13should be based on this basic principle.
Figure 12A summarizes the major ￿ndings of an entire literature. It plots the economic rate
of return to human capital at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle for a person of a given ability. The
horizontal axis represents age, which is a surrogate for the agent￿s position in the human life cycle.
The vertical axis represents the rate of return to investment assuming the same investment is made
at each age. Holding everything else constant, the rate of return to a pound of investment made
while a person is young is higher than the rate of return to the same pound made at a later
age. Returns are higher for more able people (i.e., the schedule shifts outward for the more able).
Early investments are harvested over a longer horizon than those made later in the life cycle. In
addition, because early investments raise the productivity (lower the costs) of later investments,
human capital is synergistic. Learning begets learning; skills (both cognitive and noncognitive)
acquired early on facilitate later learning. For an externally speci￿ed cost of funds (represented by
the horizontal line with intercept in ￿gure 12A), an optimal investment strategy is to invest less in
the old and more in the young. Figure 12B presents the optimal investment quantity counterpart
of ￿gure 12A.
Figure 12A is also an empirical description of the economic returns to investment at current
levels of spending in most economies around the world. The return to investment in the young
is quite high; the return to investments in the old and less able is quite low. A socially optimal
investment strategy would equate returns across all investment levels. A central conclusion of a
vast body of research summarized and extended in Heckman (2000a) and Carneiro and Heckman
(2003) is that at current investment levels in most countries, eﬃciency in public spending would be
enhanced if human capital investment were directed more toward the young and away from older,
less-skilled, and illiterate persons for whom human capital is a poor investment.
The recent literature in the economics of human development challenges a convention that
equates skill with intelligence. It demonstrates the importance of both cognitive and noncognitive
skills in determining socioeconomic success. Both types of skills are aﬀected by families and schools,
but they diﬀer in their malleability over the life cycle, with noncognitive skills being more malleable
than cognitive skills at later ages. Diﬀerences in levels of cognitive and noncognitive skills by family
income and family background emerge very early and persist, contrary to Adam Smith￿s point of
view as quoted in the introduction. Schooling widens these early diﬀerences, as Smith noted.
Current educational policy discussions focus on tested academic achievement as the major out-
put of schools. Proposed systems for evaluating school performance are premised on this idea.
While cognitive ability is an important factor in determining schooling and labor market outcomes,
noncognitive abilities, although harder to measure, also play an important role.
Noncognitive abilities matter for success both in the labor market and in schooling. Early
childhood interventions primarily improve noncognitive skills, with substantial eﬀects on schooling
and labor market outcomes, but only weakly aﬀect cognitive ability. Mentoring programs in the
early teenage years can also aﬀect these skills. Current evaluations of skill formation policy focus
too much on cognitive ability and too little on noncognitive ability.
3.1 Sources of Skill Diﬀerences
The Evidence on Credit Constraints
There is a strong relationship between family income and college attendance. Blanden and
Machin (2003) show that there are substantial diﬀerences in UK college participation rates across
14family income classes that have, if anything, increased in recent years. Vignoles and Galindo-Rueda
(2003) present supporting evidence. Parents with higher incomes are more likely to send their
children to college. This pattern is found in many other countries (see the essays in Blossfeld and
Shavit, 1993). In the late 1970s or early 1980s, college participation rates started to increase in the
UK, Scotland and the US in response to increasing returns to schooling. The increase is greatest for
y o u t hf r o mt h et o pf a m i l yi n c o m eg r o u p s . S u c hd i ﬀerential educational response by income class
promise to perpetuate or widen income inequality across generations and among social groups.
There are two interpretations of this evidence that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The
common interpretation of the evidence, and the one that guides much current policy discussions
around the world and in the UK and Scotland (Vignoles and Galindo-Rueda, 2003; Blanden and
Machin, 2003), is the obvious one. Credit constraints facing families in a child￿s adolescent years
aﬀect the resources required to ￿nance a college education. Poor families cannot aﬀo r dt os e n dt h e i r
children to college. A second interpretation emphasizes more long-run factors associated with higher
family income. It notes that family income is strongly correlated over the child￿s life cycle. Families
with high income in a child￿s adolescent years are more likely to have high income throughout the
child￿s life at home. Better family resources in a child￿s formative years are associated with higher
quality of education and better environments that foster cognitive and noncognitive skills.
Both interpretations of the evidence are consistent with a form of borrowing constraint. The
￿rst, more common, interpretation is clearly consistent with this point of view. But the second
interpretation is consistent with another type of borrowing constraint: the inability of a child to
buy the parental environment and genes that form the cognitive and noncognitive abilities required
for success in school and the labor market.
A vast quantitative literature surveyed and extended in Heckman (2000a) and Carneiro and
Heckman (2003) suggests that the second interpretation is by far the more important one. Con-
trolling for ability formed by the early teenage years, parental income plays only a minor role in
explaining college attendance and graduation. The evidence from the US and the UK suggests that
at most 8 percent of youth are subject to short-term borrowing constraints that aﬀect their postsec-
ondary schooling despite the enormous attention lavished on this problem in the population. Most
of the family income gap in enrollment in higher education is due to long-term factors that produce
the abilities needed to bene￿t from participation in college. Adjusting for long-term family factors
(measured by ability or parental background) mostly eliminates ethnic or racial gaps in schooling
in American data.
The ￿rst-order explanation for gaps in enrollment in college by family income is long-run family
factors that are crystallized in ability. Short-run income constraints do play a role in creating these
gaps, albeit a quantitatively minor one. There is scope for intervention to alleviate these short-
term borrowing constraints. One should not expect to reduce the enrollment gaps substantially by
eliminating such constraints, or ￿ddling with tuition rates although discussions in Scotland focus
on these policies.
3.2 Family Income and Enrollment in College
Children whose parents have higher incomes have access to better-quality primary and secondary
schools. Children￿s tastes for education and their expectations about their life chances are shaped
by those of their parents. Educated parents are better able to develop scholastic aptitude in their
children by assisting and directing their studies. It is known that cognitive ability is formed relatively
15early in life and becomes less malleable as children age. By age 8, intelligence as measured by IQ
tests seems to be fairly well set (see the evidence summarized in Heckman, 1995). Contrary to the
quote from Adam Smith at the beginning of this paper, diﬀerences among people are substantial by
age 8. Noncognitive skills appear to be more malleable until the late adolescent years (see Carneiro
and Heckman, 2003). The in￿uences of family factors present from birth through adolescence
accumulate to produce ability and college readiness. The scope for tuition policy in promoting
college attendance is restricted by the stock of adolescent ability.
The following experiment captures the essence of the distinction we are making. Suppose families
participate in lotteries that are adjusted to have the same expected present value (at age zero of
t h ec h i l d )b u th a v ed i ﬀerent award dates. Credit markets are assumed to be imperfect so people
cannot borrow against their own or their child￿s earnings. The timing of income receipts matters. A
family that wins the lottery in the child￿s adolescent years is compared to a family that wins in the
child￿s early formative years. The child from the family that wins late would lack all of the bene￿ts
of investment in the early years of the child that the child from the family that wins early would
receive. The child from the late-winning family would be likely to have lower levels of cognitive and
noncognitive abilities than the child from the early-winning family. A large literature supports the
importance of early investment.
3.3 Adjusting Family Income Gaps using Ability or Other Long-Term
Family Factors
Figure 13A, based on the analysis of Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003), shows that a pattern
found in many countries around the world is present in England and Scotland as well. Children
from higher income families are more likely to participate in higher education. In Scotland, the top
quartile (i.e, the top 1
4 of the family income distribution) has an average enrollment rate of almost
60% vs. an enrollment rate of 25% for the bottom quartile. The diﬀerences in England are less
dramatic but are still substantial.
The left (unadjusted) panel of ￿gure 13B shows how the English diﬀerentials are changed when
we condition on terciles (33% points) of ability as measured in a student￿s adolescent years. ￿Top￿
corresponds to children who are at the top third of the cognitive ability distribution. Middle is
for those in the middle third and bottom is for the lowest third. Within each ability group, we
classify participation rates in higher education (HE) by family income. The chart shows that
ability is a major determinant of college participation. Within ability groups, children from the top
income groups are more likely to go to college. Adjusting for an additional long run factor (father￿s
education) reduces, but does not fully eliminate the family income eﬀect (see the right hand panel
of ￿gure 13B).
Unfortunately this calculation for Scotland is less reliable because the sample is small and the
standard errors of the estimates are large (see ￿gure 13C). The big spikes shown there arise from
a small number of observations. Results from the larger English sample shown in Figure 13B
show a more consistent pattern, though its broad characteristics are by nor means abscent in the
Scottish data. Ability appears to be the major determinant of participation in higher education in
all countries. Adjusting for long run factors like father￿s schooling reduces this in￿uence further.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) presents a parallel analyses for US data where, if anything, the
pattern found in England and Scotland is more pronounced. Ability and other long run factors
16are the major determinant of college participation, not family income in the college going years.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) also show that this is true for many dimensions of college participation
(completion, delay, etc.)
Deaden et al. (2004) replicate the Carneiro and Heckman (2003) analysis for England. They
￿nd that after controlling for ability, family background and other characteristics, individuals in
the top income quartile are 7￿8% more likely to stay on in post-compulsory schooling after age 16.
They also ￿nd that there is little evidence of any credit constraints for higher education.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) report further evidence on the unimportance of short-run credit
constraints on college attendance. They estimate the eﬀect on child enrollment in college of family
per capita long term income and on family per capita income ￿ows received at various stages of
the life cycle (transitory income).42 They show that long term income matters a lot for college
enrollment and transitory income ￿ows matter little. Their evidence suggests that short-term
income constraints are not binding in explaining college choices, and largely operate through delay
in the receipt of college degrees.
Policies that improve the ￿nancing of the education of identi￿ed constrained subgroups will
increase their human capital and may well be justi￿ed on objective cost-bene￿tc r i t e r i a . T h e
potential economic loss from delay in entering college can be substantial. Given standard economic
values for attending college, and assuming schooling is delayed one year, the costs of the delay
are 9 percent of the lifetime value of schooling in the US data (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2003).
For identi￿ed constrained subgroups, the bene￿ts to reducing delay and promoting earlier college
completion, higher college quality and graduation are likely to be substantial.
In designing policies to harvest these bene￿ts, it is important to target the interventions to-
ward the constrained. Broad-based policies generate deadweight, although they promote a sense of
equality and fairness. Dynarski (2001) and Cameron and Heckman (1999) estimate that 93 percent
of President Clinton￿s Hope Scholarship funds, which were directed toward high achieving children
who largely came from middle-class families, were given to children who would have attended school
even without the program. Undirected policies can generate similar deadweight. Such policies dis-
sipate scarce funds and forego revenue that is better invested in productive educational ventures.
We discuss tuition policy in Subsection 4.6.
While targeting those identi￿ed as constrained is good policy, it is important not to lose sight
of the main factors accounting for the gaps in ￿gure 13A. Family background factors crystallized in
ability are the ￿rst-order factors explaining college attendance and completion gaps.
3.4 Early Test Score Diﬀerentials
Important diﬀerences in ability across family types appear at early ages and persist. These are
found in the UK (Vignoles and Galindo-Rueda, 2003; Feinstein, 2003) and in the US (Carneiro,
Heckman and Masterov, 2003), and similar patterns are found for other tests and in many other
data sets. Feinstein (2003) ￿nds that there is a 13 percentile diﬀerence in an index of cognitive
development at 22 months between British children from high and low SES families. By 118 months,
this diﬀerences widens to 28 percentile points.43 This means that there was considerable pre-school
42Long term income is formed as an average discounted income ￿ow to the family over the life of the child at home
(ages 0 to 18).
43Using data from the BCS, Feinstein (2003) ￿nds that the percentile rank on the cognitive development index at
22 months predicts educational attainment at age 26, though scores at 46 months yield better predictions. High SES
17educational inequality in the UK in the 1970s. This kind of inequality is present in the US as
well. Figure 14A graphs the average percentile rank on the Peabody Individual Achievement Test
in Mathematics (PIAT Math) at each age by family income.44 Ability gaps open up early and
persist. This is true for many other measures of verbal and mathematical ability. The ability that
drives schooling participation is shaped early in life. The available evidence indicates that cognitive
ability is relatively more malleable early in the life cycle (see Heckman, 1995). Having access to
more and higher-quality resources that contribute to improving cognitive ability early in life aﬀects
skill acquisition later in life.
Figure 14B presents the same average percentile ranks shown in Figure 14A, but after controlling
for the long-term family factors. The gaps in rank scores across income groups are substantially
reduced when one controls for mother￿s education, mother￿s ability, and family structure in the
test score equation. Measured long-term family factors play a powerful role, but they do not fully
eliminate the gaps.
Other analysts have also focused their attention on these gaps in cognitive ability and have
attempted to eliminate them by controlling for more factors. Using data on the Children of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Phillips et al. (1998) study the black-white test score gap.
They analyze only math and vocabulary tests at ages 3 to 4. Like Carneiro et al. (2003), they cannot
fully eliminate the test score gap using family background, mother￿s AFQT, and rich measures of
family environment, although controlling for these factors substantially reduces the gap.
The emergence of early test score diﬀerentials is not limited to cognitive measures. At early
ages, diﬀerences in US children￿s behaviors and attitudes across income groups are also evident, as
￿gure 15A illustrates. The ￿gure presents average percentile ranks in the anti-social behavior score
by family income quartile.45 It is common knowledge that motivation, trustworthiness, and other
behavioral skills are important traits for success in life. The evidence summarized in Carneiro and
Heckman (2003) shows that noncognitive skills matter greatly in labor markets and for success in
school. Hence, understanding the gaps in these behavioral skills across diﬀerent income groups (and
how to eliminate them) is also important for understanding the determinants of economic success.
Figure 15B presents adjusted percentile ranks of for the scores for behavioral measures for mother￿s
education and cognitive ability as well as family structure. Adjusting for early family background
factors substantially reduces gaps in noncognitive skills across income groups. Comparing adjusted
cognitive and noncognitive test scores reveals the importance of long-term factors in reducing the
gaps in behavioral scores across these groups. Although noncognitive ability gaps across income
quartiles cannot be eliminated at later ages, controlling for mother￿s ability, educational attainment
of the parents, family structure, and location signi￿cantly reduces the gaps in ranks in noncognitive
abilities across these groups at both early and later ages. Vignoles and Galindo-Rueda (2003)
children with low scores are much more likely to improve their scores than low SES children with poor scores.
44We used ranks because the absolute values of test scores or their growth have no meaning. Any monotonic
transformation of a test score is also a valid test score. Use of ranks avoids this diﬃculty. PIAT Math measures
a child￿s attainment in mathematics as taught in mainstream education. The tests consists of 84 multiple choice
questions of increasing diﬃculty, beginning with recognizing numerals and progressing to geometry and trigonometry.
45Mothers were asked 28 age-speci￿c questions about frequency, range and type of speci￿c behavior problems that
children age four and over may have exhibited in the previous three months. Factor analysis was used to determine
six clusters of questions, one of which is Anti-social behavior. The responses for each cluster were then dichotomized
and summed. Anti-social behavior consists of measures of cheating and telling lies, bullying and cruelty to others,
not feeling sorry for misbehaving, breaking things deliberately (if age less than 12), disobedience at school (if age
greater than 5), and trouble getting along with teachers (if age greater than 5).
18present similar evidence for the UK.
Good families promote cognitive, social, and behavioral skills. Bad families do not. Children
from broken homes or single parent families suﬀer both cognitive and noncognitive de￿cits. The
relevant policy issue is to determine what interventions in bad families are successful.
3.5 The Evidence on the Importance of Noncognitive Skills
Much of the neglect of noncognitive skills in analyses of earnings, schooling, and other life outcomes
is due to the lack of any reliable method for measuring them. Many diﬀerent personality and
motivational traits are lumped into the category of noncognitive skills. Psychologists have developed
batteries of tests to measure these skills (see, e.g., Sternberg, 1985). Companies use these tests to
screen workers, but they are not yet used to ascertain college readiness or to evaluate the eﬀectiveness
of schools or reforms of schools. The literature on cognitive tests ascertains that one dominant factor
(￿g￿) summarizes cognitive tests and their eﬀects on outcomes. No single factor has emerged as
dominant in the literature on noncognitive skills and it is unlikely that one will ever be found, given
the diversity of traits subsumed under the category of noncognitive skills.
Studies by Bowles and Gintis (1976), Edwards (1976), and Klein et al. (1991) demonstrate that
job stability and dependability are traits most valued by employers as ascertained by supervisor
ratings and questions of employers, although they present no direct evidence on wages and educa-
tional attainment. Perseverance, dependability and consistency are the most important predictors
of grades in school (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) present the cleanest evidence on this point using evidence from
the General Education Degree (GED) testing program in the United States. The GED program is
a second-chance program that administers a battery of cognitive tests to self-selected high school
dropouts to determine whether or not their level of academic attainment is equivalent to that of
high school graduates. If they pass the test, GED recipients are eligible to apply to college.
The GED examination is successful in psychometrically equating GED test takers with ordinary
high school graduates who do not go on to college. Recipients are as smart as ordinary high school
graduates who do not go on to college. GED recipients are also smarter than other high school
dropouts who do not obtain a GED, and they earn more than other high school dropouts, have
higher hourly wages, and ￿nish more years of high school before they drop out. This is entirely
consistent with the literature that emphasizes the importance of cognitive skills in determining
labor market outcomes.
When measured ability is controlled for, however, GED recipients earn less, have lower hourly
wages, and obtain lower levels of schooling than other high school dropouts. Some unmeasured fac-
tors therefore account for their relatively poor performance compared to other dropouts. Heckman
and Rubinstein (2001) identify these factors as noncognitive skills noting that a subsequent analysis
should parcel out which speci￿c noncognitive skills are the most important.
The fact that someone has received the GED sends a mixed signal. Dropouts who pass the
GED test are smarter (have higher cognitive skills) than other high school dropouts and yet at the
same time have lower levels of noncognitive skills. Both types of skill are valued in the market
and both aﬀect schooling choices. The ￿ndings of Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) challenge the
conventional signaling literature, which assumes there is a single skill that determines socioeconomic
success. It also demonstrates the folly of a psychometrically-oriented educational evaluation policy
that assumes that cognitive skills are all that matter for success in life.
19While IQ is fairly well set by age 8, motivation and self-discipline are more malleable at later
ages (Heckman, 2000a). Given the evidence on the quantitative importance of noncognitive traits,
social policy in Scotland should be more active in attempting to alter noncognitive traits, especially
in children from disadvantaged environments who receive poor discipline and little encouragement
at home. This more active social-policy approach would include mentoring programs and stricter
enforcement of discipline in the schools. We present evidence on the value of such interventions in
the section 4. Such interventions would bene￿t the child and the larger society but at the same
time might con￿ict with widely held values of sanctity of the family for those families that do not
value self-discipline and motivation and resent the imposition of what are perceived as middle-class
values on their children.
3.6 Summary
Long-term environmental factors crystallized in cognitive and noncognitive abilities play a ma-
jor role in accounting for gaps in schooling attainment across socioeconomic groups. Short-term
borrowing constraints and tuition factors that receive prominent attention in current policy dis-
cussions do not. Short-term credit constraints do, however, aﬀect a small group of persons, and
targeted-subsidy policies appear to be cost eﬀective for those persons. One cannot expect tuition
reduction policies to eliminate the substantial gaps in schooling attainment according to socioeco-
nomic background. Gaps in levels of cognitive and noncognitive skills open up early and are linked
to family environments at early ages, not parental income in the adolescent years. Noncognitive
skills substantially determine socioeconomic success later in life.
In the next part of this essay, we apply these lessons and add to them in our analyses of speci￿c
policies designed to foster skills in the Scottish population.
4A n a l y s e s o f S p e c i ￿c Policies
This part of the paper turns to the analysis of speci￿c policies. We analyze the returns to schooling
and schooling quality and the returns to job training, early childhood interventions, and mentoring
programs. We also consider tax and subsidy policy, and problems associated with the transition to
new technologies that demand new skills and make old skills obsolete. We draw on studies from
t h eU Sa n dt h eU K .
We do not discuss subsidies justi￿ed by human capital externalities. Although such externalities
have played a prominent role in the recent revival of growth theory by leading economic theorists,
no evidence for them at the current level of spending in modern societies has been found. An
accumulating body of evidence (e.g., Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and
Todd, 1996; Heckman and Klenow, 1998) suggests that these theoretical possibilities are empirically
irrelevant. Human capital ￿spillovers￿ that are not internalized in functioning markets are not to
be found in the data.
We now turn to some evidence on the eﬃcacy of various traditional and nontraditional policies.
204.1 The Returns to Schooling
F e wt o p i c si ne m p i r i c a le c o n o m i c sh a v er e c e i v e dm o r ea t t e n t i o nt h a nt h ee c o n o m i cr e t u r nt os c h o o l -
ing. By now there is a ￿rmly established consensus that the mean return to a year of schooling, as
of the 1990s, exceeds 10 percent and may be as high as 17 to 20 percent (Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2001). An extra year of college can raise earning by as much as 17%. This return is higher
for more able people (Taber, 2001) and for children from better backgrounds (Altonji and Dunn,
1996). Those from better backgrounds and with higher ability are also more likely to attend college
and earn a higher rate of return from it. The synergy or complementarity suggested in ￿gure 12A
is con￿rmed in estimates of ability and background on earnings. Both cognitive and noncognitive
skills raise earnings through promoting schooling and through their direct eﬀects on earnings. (See
the evidence in Taber, 2001; Heckman, Hsee, and Rubinstein, 2001; Carneiro, Hansen, and Heck-
man 2001, 2003.) Table 1 presents a summary of the mean rate of return to schooling for diﬀerent
ability groups. The annual return to college is substantially higher for persons with greater ability.
Those at the top 95% of the ability distribution have rates of return almost twice those at the
bottom 5%. Students at the margin of attending college or not attending have substantially lower
returns at each ability level than those who attend college (compare line 4 with line 2.)
The research of Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001, 2003) and Cunha, Heckman and Navarro
(2004) shows that returns to schooling are lower for people who are less likely to attend college.
Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) compare the marginal returns for people at various levels of
the probability of attending college. Marginal students earn less than average students. The message
of this ￿gure and of Table 1 is that college is not for everyone, because in general, ability greatly
aﬀects rates of return. Meghir and Palme (2003) ￿nd that in Sweden the returns to compulsory
schooling are highest for those with above-median ability. In fact most of the overall increase in
earning for their sample was driven by the high-ability subgroup from poor backgrounds. This body
of evidence suggests that early ability diﬀerences aﬀect returns on later investments.
4.2 Raising Schooling Quality
T h em o s tc o m m o n l ys u g g e s t e dr e f o r m sf o rs c h o o l sa r ec l a s ss i z er e d u c t i o n s ,i n s t i t u t i o no fs u m m e r
school programs, and increases in teacher salaries and per-student expenditures. Krueger (1999,
2003) suggests that these interventions are likely to be cost eﬀective, although the bene￿tc o s tr a t i o s
he presents are very low and typical of what is found in the literature. Some of the evidence on
the success of such initiatives is based on experimental evidence, such as that from the Tennessee
Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) program which has been widely publicized. Evidence
from this program has been mixed; kindergarten students in smaller classes initially have higher
test scores than those in larger classes, but in later grades, treatment and control group students￿
test scores move much closer together, although there is still a small positive eﬀect of the program
(see Hanushek 2000; for an opposing view, see Krueger 1999). There is no evidence that class size
reductions of the sort reported in the Tennessee STAR experiment will substantially aﬀect earnings
or reduce the substantial skill gaps across socioeconomic groups. Even if the test score gains from
class size reduction can be shown to be persistent, test scores are only weakly linked to earnings
later in life (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil 1999; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001).
Studies linking measures of schooling quality to lifetime earnings and occupational achievement
have recently appeared, making unnecessary reliance on inherently arbitrarily scaled test scores
21for evaluating the eﬀectiveness of interventions in schooling quality. There is a growing consensus
based on these studies that within current ranges of funding in most developed economies, changes
in measured inputs such as class size and spending per pupil have weak eﬀects on the future earnings
of students (see Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd 1996; Hanushek 1998, 2002).
Even if one takes the most favorable estimates from the literature and combines them with the
best-case scenario for the costs of raising schooling quality, decreasing the pupil-teacher ratio by 5
pupils per teacher does not turn out to be a wise investment. Such a reduction in the pupil-teacher
ratio, while keeping the number of students enrolled the same, would require the addition of new
teachers, not to mention the addition of new classroom and school facilities. Accounting only for
the costs of adding new teachers, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) estimate that decreasing the pupil-
teacher ratio by 5 pupils per teacher would cost about $790 per student.46 They present estimates
of the net returns for such a reduction in pupil-teacher ratio based on US data under diﬀerent
assumptions about productivity growth, discount rates, and the social opportunity costs of funds.
Taking a high estimate (relative to the estimates reported in the literature) of a 4 percent increase
in future earnings resulting from a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio by 5 pupils per teacher yields
a negative present value of between $2,600 and $5,500 per 1990 high school graduate at standard
d i s c o u n tr a t e s( 5t o7p e r c e n t ) . D e a r d e net al. (2002) report what an entire literature ￿nds: in
developed countries, returns to improvements in schooling quality are miniscule or nonexistent, and
rarely survive a cost-bene￿tt e s t . 47 Bell and Sarajev (2004) report that despite spending nearly
25% more per captia on education in Scotland relative to England, this diﬀerence is not apparent in
higher wages for full-time Scottish employees, conditional on individual and labor market factors.
The evidence presented here regarding the returns to reductions in pupil-teacher ratios indicates
that the United States, the United Kingdom and Scotland may be spending too much on students
given the current organization of educational production. Pouring more funds into schools to lower
class sizes by one or two pupils or to raise spending per pupil by a few hundred pounds will not
solve the problems of the Scottish primary and secondary school system, nor will it substantially
stimulate the college going of the poor.
The literature in economics does not say that school quality does not matter. Hanushek (1971,
1997), Murnane (1975), and Hanushek and Luque (2000, 2003) all show that individual teachers
matter in the sense of raising the test scores of students.48 Conventional measures of teacher
quality do not, however, predict who are the good teachers. Giving principals more discretion
in rewarding and punishing teachers would be a more eﬀective way to use local knowledge than
increasing measures of dubious predictive value. Bureaucratization of public schools hinders use of
this knowledge.
46All dollar values presented here are in 1990 dollars. This amount is roughly equivalent to £630 today.
47Dearden et al. (2002) ￿nd that the primary pupil-teacher ratio has no eﬀect once they condition on math and
verbal ability. Using similar controls, the secondary ratio has no eﬀect on educational attainment, though there are
small eﬀect on wage at age 33 (though not 23), particularly for women. Measures of school quality are not found to
have any eﬀect on the probability of employment, conditional on quali￿cations. Dustmann et al. (2003) ￿nd large
eﬀect of class size on the decision to stay on after 16, but no direct eﬀect of class size on wages independent of the
decision to stay in school.
48Machin and McNally (2003) ￿nd large gains in reading and English for 11-year-old students who were exposed to
the Literacy Hour program between 1996 and 1998. At this age the eﬀect is about 2-2.5 percentile points for reading
and about 3 % more kids achieving Level 4 or above in English. There are also some weak improvements in GSCE
performance at age 16. Unlike most interventions in school quality, the Literacy Hour focused on curricular content
and class management and not on lowering the pupil teacher ratio.
22Although the eﬀects of schooling quality vary across environments and additional funding for
some schools may be justi￿ed in certain cases, marginal improvements in school quality are unlikely
to be eﬀective in raising lifetime earnings and more fundamental changes are required if one hopes
to see a signi￿cant improvement in our educational system.
4.3 Improving School Quality Through Choice and Competition in
Schooling
Currently in Scotland, there is very little choice in schools and the incentives for excellent perfor-
mance by teachers and pupils are muted. School choice has been advocated as a reform to improve
the quality of educational services for students. Proponents of school choice argue that competi-
tion among schools to attract students will force schools to decrease costs and increase the quality
of services provided. Additionally, by having parents actively choose the schools attended by their
children, school choice systems would likely increase the degree of parental involvement in children￿s
schooling. On the other hand, opponents of school choice argue that increased competition among
schools will lead to increased strati￿cation and inequality among students as well as a dilution of
basic schooling standards and that poor parents lack the information and the ability to make in-
formed decisions for their children. Hence, school choice systems would be most bene￿cial to those
already able to exercise choice in the current system, the richer families.
Voucher experiments provide data for empirical studies concerning school choice. Experiments
that give tuition vouchers to public-school students so that they may attend private schools have
been conducted in several US cities, including Milwaukee, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and New York.49
These experiments have been studied but the conclusions of these studies have been controversial.
Researchers do not agree on whether vouchers have any impact on students￿ educational achieve-
ment. Recent research (see Peterson and Hassel, 1998) shows important diﬀerences in parental
satisfaction. Relative to parents not allowed to exercise choice, parents under school choice systems
are more likely than other parents to report satisfaction with their children￿s school. These voucher
experiments are often limited in their scale, and it is diﬃcult to generalize any ￿ndings from them
to the national level. Any national voucher program will most likely have large general-equilibrium
eﬀects that cannot be estimated from these small-scale experiments (see Urquiola and Hsieh, 2002).
Other researchers have studied the eﬀect of introducing competition among public schools into
the monopolistic setting of the US public school system. Evidence from these studies indicates that
increased school competition and student and parental choice improves the quality of schools, as
measured by test scores and by parental and student satisfaction with learning. Contrary to the view
that competition siphons resources away from the public sector to its detriment, Hoxby￿s (2000)
research suggests that when public schools are subject to greater competition both from parochial
and other private schools, the performance of all schools increases. Higher levels of achievement
are produced at lower cost. Making schools more competitive in salaries and rewarding excellent
p e r f o r m a n c eb ys t u d e n t sa sw e l la st e a c h e r sw i l lp r o m o t ep r o d u c t i v i t y .
A study by Neal (1997) demonstrates that the higher schooling attainment of students in
Catholic schools compared to those in public schools in the US is largely a consequence of gains
registered by inner-city students who choose Catholic schools over inferior inner-city public schools.
In American suburban schools, where districts are smaller and competition among school districts
49Prominent studies include Witte (2000), Peterson and Hassel (1998) and Rouse (1997).
23is more intense, the Catholic schools have little advantage over the public schools, and the perfor-
mance of both school systems is higher than in the inner-city schools. Grogger and Neal (2000)
present substantial evidence con￿rmatory of the original Neal study using a broader set of outcome
measures, including measured achievement and attainment.
The conventional argument of educational planners against choice in schools is that parents and
students are not able to make wise choices. The available evidence points to better outcomes from
increased school competition but it is far from de￿nitive. Policies that promote such competition
are much more likely to raise schooling performance than policies that increase schooling quality
and do not change the organization of schools. Exact quantitative trade-oﬀs, however, are not
available (see Hanushek 2000, 2002).
4.4 Early Childhood Investments
The evidence summarized in section 3 shows that both cognitive and noncognitive abilities aﬀect
schooling and economic success and that socioeconomic diﬀerences in cognitive and noncognitive
skills appear early and, if anything, widen over the life cycle of the child. Parental inputs are
important correlates of these skills. Yet the policy interventions supported by this evidence is far
from obvious, because the exact causal mechanisms through which good families produce good
children are not yet well understood. Perhaps for this reason, most societies have been reluctant to
intervene in family life, especially in the early years.
There is a profound asymmetry in popular views about family life and schooling. On the
one hand, there is a widespread belief that parents cannot make wise choices about their children￿s
schooling. If that is true, then how can parents be trusted to make correct decisions in the preschool
years, which recent research has demonstrated to be so important for lifetime success? The logical
extension of the paternalistic argument that denies the wisdom of parental sovereignty in choosing
schools would suggest that the state should play a far more active role in the preschool life of the
child. That is a position that few would accept.
Paternalistic interventions in the early life of children in dysfunctional families may be appro-
priate. If one is to violate the principle of family sovereignty anywhere in the life cycle process of
learning, the case for doing so is strongest at the preschool stage (and only for some groups) and
not at later stages of formal schooling, for which the argument for paternalism is most often made.
Dysfunctional families and environments are major sources of social problems and, as established in
section 2, the proportion of children growing up in dysfunctional families in Scotland and the UK
is increasing. Paternalistic interventions into the life of such families are warranted on eﬃciency
grounds, although such interventions raise serious questions about the need to protect the sanctity
of family life.
Although there are several early interventions in the UK, such as Sure Start and Eﬀective
Provision of Pre-School Education (EPPE), we do not know of any extensive evaluations of their
long term eﬀects. However, if US evidence is any indication of their potential, they should prove
to be fairly successful. Recent small-scale studies of early childhood investments in children from
dysfunctional families and disadvantaged environments have shown remarkable success and indicate
that interventions in the early years can eﬀectively promote learning. They demonstrate the value
of good families by showing that interventions that good families routinely provide can remedy
the failings of bad families. Early childhood interventions of high quality have lasting eﬀects on
learning and motivation. They raise achievement and noncognitive skills, but they do not raise
24IQ. Disadvantaged subnormal IQ children (average IQ = 80) in Ypsilanti, Michigan, were randomly
assigned to the Perry Preschool program, and intensive treatment was administered to them at ages
4 to 5. The treatment consisted of a daily 21
2 hour classroom session on weekday mornings and a
weekly ninety minute home visit by the teacher on weekday afternoons to involve the mother in the
educational process. The length of each preschool year was 30 weeks, beginning in mid-October and
ending in May. The average child-teacher ratio for the duration of the program was 5.7. Treatment
was then discontinued, and the children were followed over their life cycle.
Evidence on the treatment group, which is now about thirty-￿ve years old, indicates that those
enrolled in the program have higher earnings and lower levels of criminal behavior in their late
twenties than did comparable children randomized out of the program. Reported bene￿t-cost ratios
for the program are substantial. Measured through age 27, the program returns $5.70 for every
dollar spent. When returns are projected for the remainder of the lives of program participants, the
return on the dollar rises to $8.70 (see table 2). A substantial fraction (65 percent) of the return to
the program has been attributed to reductions in crime (Schweinhart, Barnes, and Weikart, 1993).
The Syracuse Preschool program provided family development support for disadvantaged chil-
dren, from prenatal care for their mothers through age 5 of the children￿ lives. Reductions in
problems with probation and criminal oﬀenses ten years later were as large as 70 percent among
children randomly assigned to the program. Girls who participated in the program also showed
greater school achievement (Lally, Mangione, and Honig, 1988). Studies have found short-term
increases in test scores, less in-grade retention, and higher high school graduation rates among chil-
dren enrolled in early intervention programs. Of those studies that examine delinquent or criminal
behavior, most have found lower rates of such behavior among program participants.
Recent estimates of the rate of return to the Perry preschool program are 13 percent (Barnett,
personal communication, 2002). This number looks low relative to the 15 to 20 percent return for
schooling reported by Carneiro and Heckman (2003). However, it should be compared to the return
for low-ability students, because the Perry program only recruited low-ability children. Recall that
Table 1 shows that the return to one year of college for the average individual in the ￿fth percentile
of the ability distribution is 11 percent and the return to college for the average individual in the
￿fth percentile of the ability distribution not attending college is only 7 percent. (Most of the
population at this percentile of the ability distribution is not attending college, so the latter is the
relevant number for the comparison.) For individuals at the twenty-￿fth percentile of the ability
distribution, higher than the percentile rank for the Perry participants, this return rises to 9.5
percent. The returns to maternal inputs at early ages are very high for normal children. 13 percent
is a lower bound on the return for normal children. The return to the Perry program is very high.
Evidence on the more universal Head Start program is less clear, but the program is quite
heterogeneous and is much less well funded than the Perry Preschool program. Currie and Thomas
(1995) ￿nd short-term gains in test scores for all children participating in Head Start; most of
those gains decayed quickly, however, for African American children after they left the program.
Currie and Thomas conclude that either diﬀerences in local-program administration or in quality
of schooling subsequent to the Head Start program are at the root of the diﬀerences between the
outcomes for black and white children. Ramey et al. (1988) note that the schools attended by the
Perry Preschool children were of substantially higher quality than those attended by the typical
Head Start child. In addition, the Perry program also taught parenting skills and arguably put
better long-term environments in place for the children. The failure in subsequent years to support
the initial positive stimulus of Head Start may account for the decline in the impact of Head
25Start over time, and may account for its apparent ineﬀectiveness compared to the Perry Preschool
program. In a more recent paper, Garces et al. (2002) ￿nd substantial long term eﬀects of Head
Start on high school graduation, college attendance, earnings and crime. The largest eﬀects are for
individuals whose mothers have less than a high school education. Among whites in this group,
attending Head Start leads to a 28 percent increase in the probability of high school graduation, a
27 percent increase in the probability of college attendance and a 100 percent increase in earnings
measured in the early twenties. For blacks, the likelihood of being booked or charged with crime is
12 percent lower for those who attended Head Start than for those who did not.50
As noted in section 3, an emphasis on cognitive test scores is misplaced. It appears that early
childhood programs are most eﬀective in changing noncognitive skills, although they also raise
achievement test scores (as opposed to IQ). We also note that eventual decay of initial gains in test
scores, like those found in regard to the Head Start program, were found for programs like Perry
Preschool as well, but the long-term evaluations of these programs are quite favorable in terms of
participants￿ success in school and society at large.
The fade-out eﬀects in test scores found for the Head Start program do not imply that partic-
ipation in the program has no long-term bene￿cial eﬀects. Head Start may improve the lifetime
prospects of its participants, despite yielding only short-term gains in test scores, which may not
measure many relevant dimensions of social and emotional skills.
The Perry intervention aﬀected both children and parents. Parents in the program improved
their education and labor force activity and reduced their participation in welfare. Successful en-
richment programs like Perry Preschool foster long-term improvements in the home environment
that carry over to the child long after the program has terminated. Head Start oﬀers a much lower
quality staﬀ who are also paid accordingly, part-time classes for children, and limited parental in-
volvement. The program terminates without any substantial intervention into or improvement in
the home environments of the disadvantaged children. Improvements in Head Start, proponents
argue, are likely to produce eﬀects closer to those observed in more-successful small-scale programs.
Given the potential for success of such programs (as exhibited by the Perry Preschool experiment),
more studies of the long-term impacts of various types of small-scale and broad-based early inter-
vention programs are warranted. Calculations by Donohue and Siegelman (1998) indicate that if
enriched early intervention programs were targeted toward high-risk, disadvantaged minority male
youth in the US, the expected savings in incarceration costs alone would more than repay the
substantial costs of these enriched programs.
An important lesson to draw from the Perry Preschool program, and indeed from the entire
literature on successful early interventions,51 is that the social skills and motivation of the child are
more easily altered than IQ. There also tends to be a substantial improvement in the children￿s social
attachment. The social and emotional skills acquired in these types of programs aﬀect performance
in school and in the workplace. Academics have a bias toward believing that cognitive skills are of
fundamental importance to success in life. Because of this, the relatively low malleability of IQs after
early ages has led many to proclaim a variety of interventions to be ineﬀective. Yet the evidence
from the Perry Preschool program and the evidence summarized in Carneiro and Heckman (2003)
reveals that early intervention programs are highly eﬀective in reducing criminal activity, promoting
50There is also new evidence that suggests that Head Start may not have any eﬀect. Imai (2004) uses a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach rather than the family ￿xed eﬀects method. He ￿nds no eﬀect whatsoever on cognitive
outcomes or problem behavior.
51See Carneiro and Heckman (2003) for a review.
26social skills, and integrating disadvantaged children into mainstream society. The greatest bene￿ts
of these programs are their eﬀects on socialization and not those on IQ. Social skills and motivation
have large payoﬀs in the labor market, so these programs have the potential for a large payoﬀ.T h e s e
programs may be very eﬀective as antidotes to the adverse family environments arising from the
growth of dysfunctional families. Enriching the educational and nurturing content of the recently
expanded early child care system will pay oﬀ in producing a more skilled and emotionally competent
workforce.
We next turn to the evidence on the eﬀectiveness of interventions for older children. Programs
aimed at intervening in the lives of children in their teen years attempt to redress the damage of bad
childhoods. Although these programs do not raise participants￿ IQ, there is some evidence that they
can aﬀect their social skills (noncognitive abilities), because the prefrontal cortex, which controls
emotion and behavior, is malleable until the late teenage years (Shonkoﬀ and Phillips, 2000).
4.5 Interventions in the Adolescent Years
How eﬀective are interventions in the adolescent years? Is it possible to remedy the consequences
of neglect in the early years? These questions are relevant because cognitive abilities are fairly well
determined and stable by age 8 in the sense that IQ at later ages is highly correlated with IQ at
those ages. Just as early intervention programs have a high payoﬀ primarily because of the social
skills and motivation they impart to the child and the improved home environment they produce,
so do interventions that operate during the adolescent years, and for the same reasons.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) summarizes evidence on the eﬀects of adolescent interventions on
education, earnings, and crime rates. The available schooling literature demonstrates that providing
disadvantaged students with ￿nancial incentives to stay in school and participate in learning activ-
ities can increase schooling and improve employment outcomes. It should be noted that although
programs providing such incentives have proven to in￿uence employment and earnings positively,
and often to reduce crime, they do not perform miracles. The impacts they achieve are modest,
but positive.
The evidence on programs aimed at increasing the skills and earnings of disadvantaged youth
suggests that sustained interventions targeted at adolescents still enrolled in school can positively
aﬀect learning and subsequent employment and earnings.52 Interventions for dropouts are much
less successful. It is important to remember, that the interventions conducted by such programs
only partially alleviate and do not reverse early damage caused by poor family environments.
4.6 Tuition Policy
Tuition policy is hotly debated in Scotland and elsewhere. The recent prohibition on student
contributions in Scotland and the authorization of optional variable fees in England exemplify the
sensitivity of this issue. Although in both countries these decisions were accompanied by additional
measures intended to aid students from disadvantaged backgrounds, most of the past bene￿ciaries
of such programs have been students from relatively wealthy backgrounds.53 T h em i d d l ec l a s s
52See U.S. Department of Labor (1995) for a more comprehensive survey of programs aimed at increasing the skills
and earnings of disadvantaged youth.
53Moreover, the additional funds available in England may impair Scotland￿s ability to attract and retain staﬀ,
professors and students.
27has a strong political interest in getting the rest of society to pay the college bills for its children
(Peltzman, 1973), and yet free￿or heavily subsidized￿tuition is viewed as an egalitarian policy,
opening opportunities for education to the poor.
Recent analyses challenge this widely held premise. The studies of Cameron and Heckman
(2001) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) show that variation in tuition plays only a minor role in
accounting for schooling attendance gaps by family income status. Far more important are the
abilities determined at early ages. One promotes college attendance by shaping these abilities.
One might argue that in a period of stringent public funds, charging tuition and raising standards
may be a better policy than subsidizing tuition for everyone. The increased tuition can help meet
the costs of college (and other educational expenditures) and ration places to those with a greater
demand for schooling. Merit (ability) based scholarships targeted to bright but poor children (e.g.,
the bottom income quartile of the top ability group in the right half of ￿gure 13B) can make sure
that deserving students go to school.
Our evidence that the returns to college are lower for marginal and low-ability students shows
that college is not for everyone. The absence of any clear evidence of substantial human capital
externalities at current levels of funding suggests that there is considerable scope for raising fees
a n dc h a r g i n gp e o p l ef o rt h eb e n e ￿ts they will achieve, that largely accrue to themselves. Under
the guise of equality of opportunity, current public policy in Scotland subsidizes those from more
advantaged environments rather than going to the root of family problems that cause disadvantages
in skills and motivation that appear early and persist throughout life unless treated early.
4.7 Public and Private Job Training
Because of a lack of data, the returns to private-sector training are less well studied than the returns
to public-sector training. Studies by Lynch (1992, 1993), Lillard and Tan (1986), Bishop (1994),
and Bartel (1992) ￿nd sizable eﬀects of private-sector training on earnings. In comparison with
studies of public-sector training, most of these studies do not attempt to control for the bias that
arises because more able persons are more likely to undertake training, so estimated rates of return
overstate the true returns to training by combining them with the return to ability. Part of the
measured return may result from the fact that more motivated and able persons undertake training.
Upper-bound estimates of the return to training for marginal entrants range from 16 to 26 percent
and are comparable to those obtained from education (see Mincer, 1993).
Somewhat smaller returns are found in data for the UK. These studies typically use econometric
methods to control for ability and this accounts for the lower estimated returns than those found in
the American studies which do not control for ability. Blundell et al. (1999) estimate that employer
provided training (EPT) that leads to a quali￿cation results in 7.8% return for the male worker.
EPT that does not involve formal quali￿cation leads to a return of 8.3%. Non-employer provided
training has zero eﬀect. Male workers who experience ￿ve or more training courses during the time
of the study earn 12.5% more.54 T h e r ei sa l s os o m ee v i d e n c et h a tE P Tw i t hq u a l i ￿cations is not
￿rm-speci￿c, so that workers who change employers will still gain from the experience. EPT provides
sizeable gains, especially considering that 13% of the Scottish working-age population participated
in training in 2000.55
54The corresponding eﬀects for female workers are 10%, 14%, 0% and 7.8%.
55This percentage is calculated from the Scottish Household Survey, 2000. Working age includes those between 16
28As noted in section 3, an important feature of private sector training is that the more-skilled
and more-able participants in such training do more investing in human capital even after they
attain high skill levels. Diﬀerent types of training and learning have strong complementarities with
respect to one another. The hypothesis of universal complementarity that underlies ￿gures 12A and
12B receives support in recent US data. More able people and people with more schooling are more
likely to participate in company training. Those with higher parental income, however, after their
own education and their own ability are controlled for, are more likely to train in companies after
completing their schooling. Blundell et al. (1999) ￿nd that those with more education (including
previous training) and higher cognitive ability are much more likely to participate in training. The
same patterns are found in the US (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2003).
Low-skilled and low ability persons typically do not participate in private-sector training. Firms
can be exclusive regarding participation in programs they fund in ways that government training
programs for disadvantaged workers are designed not to be. The lack of interest of private ￿rms
in training disadvantaged workers indicates the diﬃculty of the task and the likely low return to
this activity. The best available evidence indicates that public training programs are an ineﬃcient
transfer mechanism and an ineﬃcient investment policy for low-skilled adult workers. We turn to
that evidence next.
4.7.1 Evidence about Conventional Public Training and Work-Welfare Programs
Before we turn to a discussion of the bene￿ts of speci￿c training programs, it is important to
reiterate a few general points that critically aﬀect how we interpret the evidence on public sector
training. In evaluating any public project, it is necessary to account for the welfare costs of raising
public funds as well as the direct costs of providing the services.56
In accounting for human capital projects (or any other type of investment project), it is necessary
to estimate accurately the time series of the returns and to discount it appropriately to compare with
project costs. Heckman and Smith (1998) show the importance of applying these principles. They
take experimental estimates from the evaluation of a major US job training program and makes
alternative assumptions about bene￿t duration, costs, welfare costs, interest rates for discounting,
and the welfare cost of public funds. Accounting for these factors vitally aﬀects the estimates of the
economic return to training. Especially important is the assumption about bene￿td u r a t i o n .T h e
JTPA evaluation followed participants for only thirty months. When the bene￿ts of the training
provided are assumed to persist for seven years, the estimated eﬀects are larger in absolute value.57
Conventional evidence on the eﬀectiveness of public sector training reports treatment eﬀects without
doing proper cost bene￿t studies, and so these evaluations overstate net bene￿ts by not accounting
for costs.
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) present a comprehensive survey of the economic return
to public-sector training, so it is unnecessary to restate their evidence here. Martin and Grubb
a n d6 5w h ol i v ei np r i v a t er e s i d e n c e .
56As noted by Kaplow (1996), Sandmo (1998), and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001), accounting for the perceived
marginal social bene￿t of redistribution sometimes reduces the marginal welfare cost of funds below unity. The exact
￿gure for this marginal cost is a matter of some controversy in the literature.
57Seven years has been selected as the measure here because Couch (1992) shows that one intensive wage subsidy
program has annual bene￿ts of that duration. On the other hand, Ashenfelter (1978) estimated a 13 percent annual
depreciation rate of the ￿rst round impact on earnings, which suggests that an assumption of no depreciation is
grossly at odds with the evidence.
29(2001) provide a useful summary of some general lessons from the empirical literature on job train-
ing. Public job training is a heterogeneous activity. It includes classroom education, make work,
subsidized employment and job search. The rate of return to classroom training is sizeable (see
Heckman, Hohmann, Khoo and Smith, 2000). The rates of return for other components of training,
however, are generally lower, although subsidized work appears to have a large payoﬀ.E v e nw h e n
an activity such as job search assistance is pro￿table, the scale of and gains from the activity are
low. Based on the empirical record, one cannot expect substantial bene￿ts from job training (see
the evidence Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999).
Like the heterogeneity found in studies of the earnings response to education, there is consid-
erable evidence of heterogeneity in response to treatment in job training (Heckman, Smith and
Clements, 1997). Treatment is found to be most eﬀective for those at the high end of the wage
distribution. It has no eﬀe c tf o rt h o s ea tt h eb o t t o m . T h e r ea r es u b s t a n t i a lg a i n st ob er e a l i z e d
from targeting treatment. The information required to do so eﬀectively, however, is generally not
available (see Heckman, Heinrich and Smith, 2002). The returns to job training for older workers
and displaced workers are very low, a consistent ￿nding of the literature on this subject that is also
consistent with the general picture presented in ￿gure 12A.
Scotland has been seemingly more successful at job training than England. However, the results
mirror the outcomes in the US. McVicar et al. (2003) use age eligibility requirements to estimate
the eﬀect of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in Scotland. They ￿nd that NDYP increased
out￿ows from long-term unemployment, but almost half of this out￿ow was not into employment,
but into education and training. This achievement is hardly a success. Blundell et al. (2003) argues
that the eﬀect of NDYP for the UK as a whole is small: about 17,000 more employed per year, but
the cost is small as well.
4.7.2 Summary of Training Impacts
A comparison of the job training programs discussed in this section suggests a few important lessons.
First, you get what you pay for. The recently terminated American JTPA program cost very little
but produced very few results. An exception to the rule is the return to classroom training, which
is substantial (Heckman and Lochner, 2000). Second, the eﬀects of treatment vary substantially
among subgroups (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Third, job training programs also have
eﬀe c t so nb e h a v i o rb e y o n ds c h o o l i n ga n dw o r kt h a ts h o u l db ec o n s i d e r e di ne v a l u a t i n gt h e i rf u l l
eﬀects. Reductions in crime may be an important impact of programs targeted at male youth. The
evidence summarized in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) indicates that the rate of return to
most US and European training programs is close to zero, although the bene￿ts to certain groups
may be substantial, and some may pass cost-bene￿t tests. We cannot look to public job training to
remedy or alleviate substantially skill de￿cits that arise at early ages. They have also proven to be
ineﬀective in equipping middle age workers for the modern economy. We next consider tax policy.
4.8 Tax and Subsidy Policy
Progressive income taxes of the sort in place in the United Kingdom retard skill formation. In
addition generous social welfare payments of the sort recently implemented in the UK discourage
work and hence investment in workplace based skills. Tax rules in the United Kingdom tend to
promote human capital formation over physical capital formation. UK tax rules tend to encourage
30investments made on the job over investments in formal schooling, especially schooling that requires
substantial out-of-pocket or tuition costs. Although many of the eﬀects of the current tax system
on human capital investment may be unintended, they may nevertheless be substantial and may
favor certain workers as well as certain types of investment over others. Based on studies for the
US, we ￿nd that tax reforms are unlikely to have substantial eﬀects on skill formation.
To understand how taxes in￿uence human capital investment, it is helpful to understand the
costs of and returns to such investment. The costs of investment in human capital are foregone
earnings net of taxes plus any additional tuition or out-of-pocket expenses. Higher proportional
taxes reduce the costs of spending an hour in school by the amount they reduce the return of
working an hour in the market.
The simplest case to consider is a regime with ￿at (proportional) taxes in which the only human
capital investment cost is foregone income. In this case, changes in the level of the ￿at wage tax will
have no eﬀect on human capital accumulation, because increases in the tax rate reduce the return
by the same proportion as they reduce the cost. On the other hand, if there are tuition expenses
that are not tax deductible, as they are not in the UK, a higher tax rate discourages investment in
human capital, because it lowers the returns to investment more than the costs. In the case of a 10
percent increase in the tax rate, the return to investment decreases by 10 percent, and the cost of
foregone income declines by 10 percent, but the tuition cost remains unchanged if tuition cannot
be deducted from taxable income. Thus, the return to investment declines by more than the costs,
so human capital investment is discouraged.
The current UK tax system, however, is not ￿at. The progressiveness in the tax schedule dis-
courages human capital investment. The gain in earnings resulting from human capital investment
causes some individuals to move up into a higher tax bracket. For such individuals, the returns from
investment are taxed at a higher rate, but the cost is expensed at a lower rate. This discourages
human capital accumulation.
Taxes on physical capital are another important component of the tax system that can aﬀect
human capital investment decisions. The level of human capital investment declines when the after-
tax interest rate increases, because the discounted returns to investment are then lower. Reducing
the tax on interest income can have a bene￿cial eﬀect both on capital accumulation and on real
wages. This illustrates the important point that the taxes on capital have real eﬀects on human
capital accumulation.
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998b, 2000) and Heckman (2001), estimate that for the US.
economy, a revenue-neutral move to a ￿at tax on consumption in the steady state would raise the
wages of both skilled and unskilled workers and raise aggregate output by 5 percent (and aggregate
consumption by 3.7 percent) while raising the wages of college graduates and high school graduates
equally (7 percent). Such a move would barely aﬀect overall inequality in earnings while promoting
the accumulation of greater levels of both human capital and physical capital.58 The major eﬀect of
such a reform, however, would be on physical capital and its feedback eﬀects on wages through the
increased productivity of labor. It would have only a small eﬀect on human capital accumulation.
Tilting the bias in the tax system toward capital and away from human capital would improve the
58In order to account for the constancy of capital￿s share over time in the U.S. economy, they use a Cobb-Douglas
(in capital) model, and hence assume no capital-skill complementarity. Although some others claim to ￿nd such
complementarity, they are hard-pressed to explain the near constancy of the capital share over time. This absence
of capital-skill complementarity is the reason for the absence of any substantial eﬀe c t so ne a r n i n g si n e q u a l i t yf r o ma
revenue-neutral move to a consumption tax.
31earnings of both capital and labor in the long run.59
Reforms to tax policy on interest income are either ignored or misrepresented in popular discus-
sions. Populists see such a move as favoring capital and hence rich people. They ignore the crucial
point that higher levels of capital stocks raise the wages of all workers in a roughly uniform way.
4.9 The Problem of the Transition
Skill-biased technical change operates to make workers trained under old regimes obsolete at pre-
vailing wages in new regimes. This phenomenon operates with a vengeance in transition economies
in Eastern Europe and Latin America that have opened up markets and now trade at world prices.
These factors are also operating in Scotland.
Younger workers trained under old technologies can, and have, adapted to new technologies
through retraining and education. For older workers, with more limited horizons of working life
and lower levels of skill and ability, such reeducation is rarely economically eﬃcient. Displaced
workers in their forties who are oﬀered generous retraining subsidies frequently refuse them, and
the return to such training is low (see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999 for a summary of
studies from around the world). Models of workers with heterogeneous ability and skill show that
skill-biased technical change creates cohorts of workers with low earning power in the post-change
economy (Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998b). Their children adapt to the new economy through
investments in human capital.
In the long run, the economy adjusts to a new, higher level of skill requirements, but the long run
can last thirty years or longer and the newly disadvantaged workers created by a regime of technical
change pose serious social and economic problems. Investment in them is often not economically
eﬃcient. Based on the best available evidence, the most economically justi￿ed strategy for improving
the incomes of low-ability, low-skill adults is to invest more in the highly skilled, tax them, and
then redistribute the tax revenues to the poor. Some would argue that the Blair government has
done just this in creating incentives not to work by raising transfer bene￿ts.
Many people view the work ethic as a basic value and would argue that cultivating a large class of
transfer recipients breeds a culture of poverty and helplessness. If value is placed on work as an act
of individual dignity, because of general bene￿ts to families, and especially the early environments
of young children and because of bene￿ts to communities and society as a whole, then society may
be prepared to subsidize ineﬃcient jobs. Increased subsidies to employment induce people to switch
out of criminal activities (Lochner, 1999). Subsidies induce labor supply and output that partially
oﬀsets the cost of the subsidy, and so they are a cheaper alternative than welfare (Phelps, 1997). The
problem with giving such subsidies to adults is that they may discourage skill formation among the
young if the subsidies are extended to them (see Heckman, Lochner and Cossa, 2003). To alleviate
these adverse incentive eﬀects, wage subsidies should be given on a cohort-speci￿cb a s i s .
Current thinking does not recognize the need to distinguish policies for diﬀerent cohorts. Subsi-
dizing work through the EITC (US) or WFTC (UK) can reduce the incentives to acquire skills and
so perpetuate poverty across generations. Raising earnings today makes it more expensive to forego
current earnings to improve one￿s future skills. This eﬀect is strengthened by progression in the
59Low-ability and unskilled members of the current generation do not bene￿tf r o mas w i t c ht oa￿at tax. Most
ability types would bene￿tf r o ma￿at consumption tax. Heckman (2001) shows that both types of reform are more
popular in a period of skill-biased technical change, because tax reform facilitates transition to the new, higher skilled
equilibrium.
32British tax system. Even though a policy that subsidizes work only for the old is inequitable across
generations, it is socially eﬃcient because it encourages the young to acquire the skills needed in
the modern workplace. The policy prescription based on a ￿rm empirical literature is to invest in
the young and subsidize the work of the old, and the less able, and not invest in them. A little
intergenerational inequity in the short run can promote eﬃciency in the long run.
Open markets, with ￿exible wages, will permit wages to adjust so that unskilled workers can
￿nd employment. This is the policy Adam Smith envisioned for Scotland in 1776 and it remains
v a l i dt o d a y . O l d e rw o r k e r sw h o s es k i l l sh a v eb e c o m eo b s o l e t ec a ns t i l lb ep r o d u c t i v ea tt h er i g h t
price. The right price may be too low from the point of a socially acceptable living wage. The
appropriate policies for them is to encourage them to work and to subsidize their employment. The
right policy for their children is to give them skills to be productive in the new economy.
5S u m m a r y
This paper presents a framework for thinking about human capital policy in Scotland. It stresses
the need to recognize the dynamic nature of the human capital accumulation process and the
multiplicity of actors and institutions that determine human capital investments. Good policy
recognizes heterogeneity in skills and human ability in designing policies to foster skill. It stresses
the need to conduct cost-bene￿t analyses to rank proposed policies rigorously.
Because human capital is an investment good, it is important to account for the life cycle
dynamics of learning and skill acquisition in devising eﬀective human capital policies. Schooling
is only one phase of a lifetime skill accumulation process. Families, ￿rms, and schools all create
human capital. Any comprehensive analysis of human capital policy must account for the full range
of institutions that produce it.
Learning begets learning because of dynamic complementarities. The empirical evidence sum-
marized in this paper points in this direction. Recent research has demonstrated the importance of
the early years in creating the abilities and motivations that aﬀect learning and foster productivity.
Recent research has also demonstrated the importance of both cognitive and noncognitive skills in
the workplace and in the skill acquisition process. Noncognitive skills are a form of human capital
and can be produced. Some of the most eﬀective interventions operate on noncognitive skills and
motivations. Evidence from dysfunctional families reveals the value of healthy ones.
We have demonstrated the ￿rst-order importance of abilities andm o t i v a t i o ni np r o d u c i n gs k i l l s .
Cognitive and noncognitive de￿cits emerge early, before schooling, and if uncorrected, create low-
skilled adults. A greater emphasis needs to be placed on family policy. Studies of a limited set of
small-scale, high-quality interventions reveal that early cognitive and noncognitive de￿cits can be
partially remedied.
The traditional approach to skill formation policy focuses on schools. But families are just
as important as, if not more important than, schools in producing human capital. The evidence
from failed families points to possible bene￿ts from interventions in them. This raises a new set of
questions about whether or not society should respect the sanctity of the family in regard to certain
dysfunctional groups.
Schools matter. The evidence shows that teachers matter, but that it is diﬃcult to use conven-
tional measures of teacher quality to assess who is a good teacher. Principals and parents know
this. Schemes to improve productivity in schools should allow agents to use their local knowledge
33to create the right incentives. Movement toward choice, competition and local incentives will likely
foster productivity in the classroom.
The evidence also shows that education policies based on objective quality measures (class size,
teacher salaries, and the like) that receive most of the attention in public policy debates are unlikely
to produce dramatic gains in Scottish educational achievement. At current levels of educational
support, marginal changes in conventional quality measures yield only modest bene￿ts and often
fail a cost-bene￿tt e s t .
Much of the evidence that is alleged to support the existence of widespread credit market
problems in the ￿nancing of college education is found upon examination to be weak. At the same
time, there appears to be a small group of secondary school graduates (about 8 percent) who are
constrained and for whom a targeted transfer policy may be eﬀective. Untargeted programs can
generate deadweight losses.
Scotland should seriously consider devising a more selective tuition policy by charging those
who bene￿t most and providing relief for the small minority of bright, but poor children. This is
one way to raise revenue and promote equality in the society at large. Persons who bene￿tf r o m
education should pay for it. College is not for everyone and policies that charge persons for the
bene￿ts that they receive will raise money for further skill investment and will help ration scarce
resources. Scholarships to a small group of bright but poor children are justi￿ed on cost bene￿t
grounds.
Targeting the persons who can bene￿t from interventions will improve the eﬃciency of the
interventions. The trick is in identifying the groups for whom the interventions are likely to be
eﬀective. In many human capital programs this has proved to be an elusive goal.
The recent literature stresses the need to carefully assess the full life cycle stream of the costs
and bene￿ts of human capital interventions. Tax policy is unlikely to be a strong lever to pull
to foster human capital development. At the same time, eﬀective tax policy that fosters capital
accumulation can have a substantial bene￿cial eﬀect on wages.
We have stressed carefully the need to develop cohort-speci￿c strategies. Middle-age workers
whose skills have become obsolete make poor investments. The young and the more able make good
investments. A better policy for the older displaced workers is to subsidize their employment and to
make markets ￿exible. Younger workers should be trained with skills to enhance their productivity.
Subsidizing the young directly will discourage skill formation and perpetuate poverty across the
generations.
We have not discussed immigration policy in this essay. One way for Scotland to build the
skills of its work force is to provide bounties for skilled labor to work in Scotland. Given that in
a competitive market persons largely harvest the bene￿ts they confer, it is far from clear that a
national policy to attract skilled immigrants is desirable. There is little scope for policy interventions
of this type. Flexible labor markets and incentives for excellence will attract top ￿ight persons
trained elsewhere to come to Scotland. They will also retain top ￿ight Scots to stay, and promote
a culture of excellence in the nation.
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Note: Wages are shown in 2 year averages and are expressed in £1995. O Levels category contains those with NVQ level 2 or equivalent; GNVQ intermediate; RSA diploma;
City and Guilds craft; BTEC/SCOTVEC first or general diploma; O level, GCSE grade A−C or equivalent qualifications. A Levels category contains those with NVQ level 3;
GNVQ advanced; A level or equivalent; RSA advanced diploma or certificate; OND/ONC, BTEC/SCOTVEC national; City and Guilds advanced craft; Scottish 6th year
certificate (CSYS); SCE higher or equivalent; AS level or equivalent and trade apprenticeship certifications. Degree category contains those who have a higher degree;
NVQ level 5; first degree, or other degree qualifications.
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Figure 1

















1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Scotland England
Source: Data for men and women ages 16−24.
Males and Females from GHS
Figure 2A
















1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Scotland England
Source: Data for men and women ages 16−24.
Males and Females from GHS
Figure 2B
 Labor Force Attrition Rate Rate For Those With Low or No QualificationsChapter 2 38
all types per 100 respondents – an incidence risk. They are complementary measures
of risk, and are presented in Figure 6.24
The six countries with the highest overall prevalence victimisation rates are Aus-
tralia (30% of people were victimised once or more), England and Wales (26%), 
the Netherlands (25%) and Sweden (25%), Canada (24%) and Scotland (23%). They
have significantly higher overall victimisation rates (in a statistical sense at the 10%
probability level) than the average of all ICVS countries. Northern Ireland, Japan,
Figure 6 Overall victimisation
Countries are sorted by prevalence rates.
* Incidence rates for Switzerland are estimated.
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Incidence = number of incidents


























































24 Prevalence risks for the eleven crimes are in Table 1 in Appendix 4. Incidence risks for ten crimes are 
in Table 2, Appendix 4. Ten crimes are shown here as incidence rates for attempted burglary are not
available for 1988. Incidence risks for Switzerland for 2000 are estimated on the basis of the relation-
ship between prevalence and incidence risks in previous sweeps.
Figure 3. Overall Victimization
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1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Year of Birth
US Whites England Scotland
Source: US sample contains only Whites. UK data is separated by place of residence, not by birth. The data is presented
in 5 year moving averages. In the UK, the college category contains those who have a higher degree; NVQ level 5; first
degree, or other degree qualifications. For the US, those with 4−year college, professional and terminal degrees are included.
Data from QLFS 2002 and CPS 2000
Figure 4

















1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Year of Birth
US Whites England Scotland
Source: US sample contains only Whites. UK data is separated by place of residence, not by birth. The data is presented
in 5 year moving averages. In England, dropouts are defined as those who lack college (or more), A or O level qualifications
(or their equivalents). In the US, they are defined as ordinary dropouts and GED recipients.
Data from QLFS 2002 and CPS 2000
Figure 5














1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Year of Birth
US College Completion US College Enrollment
Source: US sample contains only Whites and excludes those who are currently enrolled.  Enrollment refers to
participation in any type of post−secondary education, even if no degree was received. Completion refers to the
attainment of a bachelor’s degree. The data is presented in 5 year moving averages.
Data CPS 2000, Whites Only
Figure 6
















1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Year
Scotland England
Source: The API is the number of young (under 21) home initial entrants expressed as a percentage of the averaged
18 to 19 year old population.
Figure 7
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IALS Prose Literacy Scale at Levels 4−5
The scale scores were grouped into five levels of increasing difficulty. Levels 4 and 5 were combined. The sample is
restricted to adults who are between 16−65 years of age at the time of the survey (1994 for the US and Germany, 1996
for the UK, and 1994−1995 for Sweden). Standard errors are calculated using the methodology described in IALS (2002).
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IALS Document Literacy Scale at Levels 4−5
The scale scores were grouped into five levels of increasing difficulty. Levels 4 and 5 were combined. The sample is
restricted to adults who are between 16−65 years of age at the time of the survey (1994 for the US and Germany, 1996
for the UK, and 1994−1995 for Sweden). Standard errors are calculated using the methodology described in IALS (2002).
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IALS Quantitative Literacy Scale at Levels 4−5
The scale scores were grouped into five levels of increasing difficulty. Levels 4 and 5 were combined. The sample is
restricted to adults who are between 16−65 years of age at the time of the survey (1994 for the US and Germany, 1996
for the UK, and 1994−1995 for Sweden). Standard errors are calculated using the methodology described in IALS (2002).

































Source: Data is from the Progress In Reading Literacy Survey (PIRLS) of 4th graders conducted in 2001.
Overall Reading Score by Gender and Country











(a) Rates of return to human capital investment initially 
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Higher Education by Family Income For England and Scotland
Men and Women from BCS 
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Adjusted
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Higher Education by Family Income For England
                   Men and Women from BCS
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Adjusted
ﬁ
Higher Education by Family Income For Scotland
                 Men and Women from BCS
Note: Higher education includes both vocational and academic degrees. Adjusted by paternal education.
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*The income measure we use is average family income between the ages of 6 and 10. Income quartiles are 

















Lowest income quartile Second income quartile Third income quartile Highest income quartile
Figure 14A
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*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT and broken home at each age (we use AFQT 
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Figure 14B
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*The income measure we use is average family income between the ages of 6 and 10. Income quartiles are 
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Figure 15A
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*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT and broken home at each age (we use AFQT 
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Figure 15B
Source: Carneiro and Heckman (2003).Table 1
Return to one year of college for individuals
at diﬀerent percentiles of the math test score distribution
White males from High School and Beyond
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Average return in the population 0.1121 0.1374 0.1606 0.1831 0.2101
(0.0400) (0.0328) (0.0357) (0.0458) (0.0622)
Return for those who attend college 0.1640 0.1893 0.2125 0.2350 0.2621
(0.0503) (0.0582) (0.0676) (0.0801) (0.0962)
Return for those who do not attend college 0.0702 0.0954 0.1187 0.1411 0.1682
(0.0536) (0.0385) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0425)
Return for those at the margin 0.1203 0.1456 0.1689 0.1913 0.2184
(0.0364) (0.0300) (0.0345) (0.0453) (0.0631)
Source: Carneiro and Heckman (2003).Ta b l e 2
Pe rry Prescho ol: Net present val ues of costs and bene ﬁts through a  ge 27
1. Cost of prescho ol for chil d, a ges 3-4 12,148
2. Decrease in cost to gove rnment of K-12
sp ecial education courses for child, ages 5 to 18  6,365
3. Decrease in direct criminal justice system costsa
of chil d’s criminal activi ty, ages 15 to 28  7,378
4. Decrease in direct criminal justice system costsa
of chil d’s pro jected crimi nal activity, ages 29 to 44  2,817
5. Income from child’ s increased
employ ment, ages 19 t o 27 8,380
6. Pro j ected income from child’s
increased employment, ages 28 to 65  7,565
7. Decrease in tangible losses to cri me
victims, ages 15 to 44 10,690
To t a l be n e ﬁts: 43,195
To t a l b e n e ﬁts excluding pro j ectionsb  32,813
Bene ﬁts mi nus costs 31,047
Bene ﬁts mi nus cos ts excludi ng pro j ectionsb  20,665
Notes:All values are net present values in 1996 dol lars at age 0 calculated
using a 4 percent discount rate. 
aDirect criminal justice system costs are the administrati ve costs of incar ceration.
bBenefits from pro jected decreased criminal activity (4) and pro jected income 
from increased employ ment (6) are excluded. 
1
Sources: Karoly et al. (1998) and Barnett (1993).